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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the Norwegian Special Operations Forces’ capabilities to 
cope with today’s security environment, which is characterized more by unorthodox 
threats like, for example, insurgencies, and less by “conventional” wars between nation 
states. Thus, this study raises the hypothesis that the Norwegian Special Operations 
Forces (NORSOF) is less than optimally suited for counterinsurgency operations. 
Using the dichotomy of a direct approach vs. an indirect approach as a framework 
for how NORSOF conducts operations, this author claims that NORSOF mainly has 
focused on direct capabilities and less so on indirect capabilities, the latter which 
experience has proved to be so effective and efficient in counterinsurgency operations. 
Analysis of the characteristics of insurgency and how to counter it leads to the conclusion 
that NORSOF will enhance its relevance and efficacy if it also acquires indirect 
capabilities and thus can employ both a direct as well as an indirect approach, depending 
on the situation. However, although NORSOF may play an important role in 
counterinsurgency operations, there are several limitations that inhibit NORSOF’s role in 
this type of operations. Accordingly, NORSOF’s operations must be seen in the larger 
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I. THE RELEVANCE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Cold War, one of the most controversial issues in the 
Norwegian defense and security policy has been the issue of the role of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces (NAF). Should they have a purely domestic focus, or in the absence of any 
direct threat, a more international focus. The latter view has prevailed. Since 2001, the 
NAF have been undergoing one of the most extensive public reorganizations in modern 
Norwegian history.1  The overarching goal of this reorganization has been to change the 
NAF from its threat-based organizational structure developed during the Cold War to a 
capability-based structure which can meet diffuse challenges in a new security 
environment.2 This reorganization notwithstanding, Norway has for a long time 
contributed forces to operations abroad, currently most notable in Afghanistan. This 
includes Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF).3 Moreover, NORSOF has in 
later years been designated as a joint strategic force of considerable importance to 
Norway.4 As a corollary to this, in the future, NORSOF is likely to be frequently 
deployed to various conflicts, and thus play an instrumental role in the Norwegian 
security and defense policy. 
                                                 
1 Forsvarsdepartementet, Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005-2008 
[Modernizing the Armed Forces 2005-2008], Parliamentary Bill no. 42 (2003-2004), Regjeringen (Ministry 
of Defense [Online 10 Jan, 2007]), p. 9; Forsvarsdepartementet; Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, 
interesser og verdier [A Defense for the Protection of  Norway’s Security, Interests and Values], 
Parliamentary Bill no. 48 (2007-2008), Regjeringen (Ministry of Defense [Online 21 May 2008]), p. 10. 
2 Forsvarsdepartementet, ”Relevant Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces”, 
Regjeringen, 2004 (Ministry of Defense [Online 25 Jan 2008]), 11-12. 
3 In this study NORSOF is used exclusively as a common term for the two tactical units 
Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK) and Forsvarets Spesialkommando/Hærens Jegerkommando (FSK/HJK). 
The term NORSOF was first used when both units deployed to Afghanistan in 2001/2002 in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom. NORSOF is now a common term for the two units. It is also worth 
mentioning that since then, the Air Force has been tasked to stand up a SOF-capable helicopter unit, 137 
Special Operations Air Wing. However, this unit will not be explicitly discussed in this study as it still is 
under formation, and, moreover, its role is mainly to support SOF and conventional units.  
4 Forsvarsdepartementet, Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005-2008, 53-54. 
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Due to the nature of some of these conflicts and the role Norwegian forces have 
played in them, a question arises that until now has not been given any particular 
attention. That is the question of what implications does it have for NORSOF to 
participate in counterinsurgency operations? The purpose of this study is to study 
NORSOF in a counterinsurgency environment in order to determine if there are any 
changes to the doctrine, operational concepts, training, or tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTPs) that should be implemented in order to enhance NORSOF’s efficacy 
in counterinsurgency operations. I hypothesize that NORSOF is less than optimally suited 
for counterinsurgency operations. NORSOF’s capabilities are therefore not consistent 
with today’s security environment which is characterized more by unorthodox threats like 
for example insurgencies, international terrorism ,etc., and less by “conventional” wars 
between nation states.5 One of the major distinctions between these two forms of conflict 
is that in the latter, a direct approach and kinetic operations are fundamental; while in the 
former, an indirect approach and non-kinetic operations often are more favorable. This 
being said, it is not a question of purely a kinetic or non-kinetic approach, but more a 
question of a proper balance between the two approaches in which one is more 
predominant because of the nature of the conflict.  
There is no doubt that during the last decade, NORSOF has been strengthened 
both in terms of personnel and equipment. However, the question this study seeks to 
answer is what can be done to improve NORSOF’s ability to face today’s unorthodox 
challenges where an indirect approach and non-kinetic kinetic operations often are a 
prerequisite for success.  
Fleshing out a broad and theoretical connection between NORSOF and 
counterinsurgency is no easy task. I do not presume to provide the magical answer in this 
study. What I do hope to offer is a critical first step, a theoretical approach to understand 
why and how counterinsurgency affects NORSOF. 
                                                 
5 See among others James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 
American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 1 (Feb. 2003): 75-90; and Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan 
and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006). 
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B. THE PROBLEM 
Insurgency is hardly a new phenomenon, and, more importantly, it has probably 
been the most prevalent form of violent conflict since the creation of organized political 
communities.6 The latter is especially true for the twentieth century and onward. During 
the Second World War there was such an upsurge in guerrilla warfare and insurgency that 
the renown military theorist Captain B. Liddell-Hart argued that “…guerrilla warfare 
became so widespread as to be an almost universal feature. It developed in all the 
European countries that were occupied by the Germans and most of the far eastern 
countries occupied by the Japanese…”7 This continued on after the war and well until the 
mid-1970s as the former colonies one after another sought their independence; many by 
insurgency or a war of liberation.  
As the Cold War was at its height, most countries’ main focus was on large 
conventional wars and less so on “small wars.” This resulted in the common assumption 
that counterinsurgency was a niche and, consequently, that conventional military 
operations were much more in demand. This is an old and common assumption, but 
arguably a wrong one. Already in 1962, Bernard Fall8 predicted that the world was now 
entering “the century of insurgencies.” In 1991, the noted military theorist Martin van 
Creveld argued in his book, “The Transformation of War” that as the Cold War came to 
an end, conventional war as we knew it was on its decline, and that small wars would 
dominate future warfare.9 Admittedly, he must be said to have been correct in his 
assessment, as we have seen less conventional wars between states and more small wars 
like civil wars, insurgencies, and more recently, the “Global War on Terror.” Thus, one 
 
                                                 
6 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse (Washington D.C.: 
Potomac Books, Inc, 2005), 1. 
7 J. Paul de B. Taillon, The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism: The British and 
American Experiences (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers), 14-15. 
8 Bernard Fall was a French war journalist who wrote extensively on the war in Indochina and 
Vietnam. One of his most notable books, “Street Without Joy,” described the French effort to fight the Viet 
Minh in Indochina became a best seller. Fall was killed in Vietnam in 1967 by on a landmine when 
covering the war. 
9 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 
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 cannot expect that there will be less demand for counterinsurgency capabilities in the 
future. The British, for example, has since 1945, been continuously involved in “low 
intensity operations”,10 in which counterinsurgency falls under. 
Most countries have had problems coming to grips with insurgencies, as 
manifested by the French, American and Soviet defeats in Indochina, Vietnam and 
Afghanistan respectively. The current insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq serve as 
disheartening reminders of how little we have learned from history. The American 
experience of counterinsurgency support, which has been part of American strategy since 
the 1960s, is a recipe for ineffectiveness or failure.11 Arguably, this applies to most 
countries. Moreover, history shows us that countries engaged in counterinsurgency have 
learned very little from each other’s experiences, as most counterinsurgents have applied 
the wrong strategy, forces and tactics. The common way to fight insurgencies has been to 
view them as small wars - conventional conflicts, albeit with a lesser scale and intensity. 
This approach is wrong, as insurgencies have distinct characteristics which are quite 
different from conventional wars, and thus require a different approach, as will be 
discussed in this study. 
The changed security environment in the wake of al-Qaeda’s attack on the U.S. 
homeland September 11, 2001, has brought this problem even closer to Norway. As a 
result of this attack, NORSOF deployed to Afghanistan in early 2002 as part of the U.S. 
led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).12 Since then, Norway has continually had forces 
in Afghanistan as part of OEF or the NATO led International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF). Although Norwegian conventional forces have constituted the majority of 
Norwegian personnel in Afghanistan, NORSOF has had several substantial subsequent 
deployments to Afghanistan.   
 
                                                 
10 Taillon, 1. 
11 Steven Metz and Raymond A. Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: 
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” Special Warfare, Vol. 17, No. 3. 2005, 6. 
12 Forsvaret, “Spesialstyrker til Afghanistan” [Special Operations Forces to Afghanistan], Forsvarsnett 
(Norwegian Defense [online 16 Jan 2008]). 
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As a corollary to the changed security environment where insurgencies flourish, 
and maybe more importantly, that Norwegian forces for years have been involved in 
combating the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, one should expect that insurgency and 
counterinsurgency were topics that were subject to both a Norwegian military 
professional as well as a more scholarly debate. Remarkably, this is not the case as both 
topics currently receive little attention in Norway.13 What makes this an even greater 
paradox, is that the Norwegians themselves have five years of firsthand experience as 
insurgents fighting against Nazi occupiers14. This insurgency, although it did not amount 
to much against the powerful Nazis, reaped much recognition from rest of the world. 
President Roosevelt for example on several occasions praised the Norwegian resistance 
fight, most notably in his “Look to Norway” speech in September 1942, in which he 
among other things proclaimed that:  
If there is anyone who still wonders why this war is being fought, let him look to 
Norway. If there is anyone who has any delusions that this war could have been averted, 
let him look to Norway; and if there is anyone who doubts the democratic will to win, 
again I say, let him look to Norway. 
Needless to say, this speech served as an inspiration to freedom fighters in 
Norway as well as in the rest of the occupied Europe.15  
Because of insurgencies continuing and predicted future importance, and the 
likelihood of NORSOF being involved in some of them, this subject deserves serious and  
 
                                                 
13 The new Joint Doctrine breaks with the former in that it acknowledges that today’s security 
environment is more complex than earlier presumed. Thus it is also concerned with combating irregular 
forces. Another exception is Professor Nils Marius Rekkedal who has published some articles on the 
subject. Se for example: Nils Marius Rekkedal. “Trekk ved opprør og opprørsbekjempelse” [Characteristics 
of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency], Norsk militært tidsskrift [Norwegian Military Review] Vol. 12 
2004, 22-27.   
14 It is worth noting that the Norwegian resistance movement operated on behalf of the Norwegian 
Government which was in exile in Great Britain. This insurgency is therefore somewhat different from 
most of the other insurgencies this study refers to as these insurgent movements do not represent a 
legitimate power. 
15 Another who might have been inspired by this speech is the noted American novelist, John 
Steinbeck who in 1942 published his book “The Moon is Down” (translated to Norwegian in 1945) which 
is about Norwegian villagers resisting their German occupiers.   
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systematic analysis. In this study, I set forth a way to do precisely that. This study is 
written for the Norwegian special operations operator of today to help him prepare for the 
operations of tomorrow.  
C. PURPOSE, SCOPE AND QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this thesis is to study NORSOF in a counterinsurgency 
environment in order to determine if there are any changes to the doctrine, operational 
concepts, training, or tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that should be 
implemented in order to enhance NORSOF’s efficacy.      
The scope of this study is to consider NORSOF and its capability to operate 
effectively in a counterinsurgency environment.  
The central question this study seeks to answer is therefore: How can NORSOF 
be made optimally suited for effective counterinsurgency operations? In order to answer 
this question, this study has been organized to address four issues: 
• Is there a need for a NORSOF counterinsurgency capability?  
• How does NORSOF’s understanding of counterinsurgency match with 
historic best practices of how to combat insurgency? 
• What are the changes that can be made that will enhance NORSOF’s 
efficacy in counterinsurgency operations?  
• What are the limitations concerning NORSOF’s roles or capabilities 
regarding counterinsurgency?  
Chapter II will start with an outline of what the terms insurgency and 
counterinsurgency and some related terms imply. This outline is necessary since there 
seems to be some confusion, both academically and doctrinally concerning these terms. 
This clarification is also a prerequisite for the ensuing discussion to be clear. Existing 
literature on the subject, along with current doctrines, national as well as allied, will 
therefore be examined in order to clarify these and similar terms. In the second part of 
this chapter the first question of this study will be addressed specifically; i.e., is there a 
need for NORSOF to inhibit a counterinsurgency capability? Although this introduction 
alludes to the answer being yes, this question is so fundamental that it needs to be 
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discussed in more detail. Literature describing the current and future security 
environment, current doctrines, national and allied, will therefore be examined along with 
national governmental whitepapers. In Chapter III, the nature and characteristics of 
insurgency will be described in detail using existing literature. Questions like: What 
causes men to revolt; what strategies do insurgents employ; what doctrine do they follow; 
and what are the prerequisites for a successful insurgency; are all important questions that 
need to be answered in order to effectively counter the insurgency at hand. Like a 
physician treating an illness, the counterinsurgent needs to know as much about the 
particular ailment as possible in order to find the most effective treatment.  
Likewise, in Chapter IV, the characteristics of a successful counterinsurgency will 
be outlined in detail. Also here, current and allied doctrine as well as existing literature 
on the subject will be analyzed. Successful counterinsurgent strategies and tactics will be 
examined. This chapter will also emphasize historic and contemporary counterinsurgency 
operations, successful as well as failed ones, in order to describe “best practice.”    
Chapter V will begin with a discussion of the second question this study 
addresses: How does NORSOF’s understanding of counterinsurgency match with historic 
best practices of how to combat insurgency? I will then answer the third question: Are 
there any changes that can be made that will enhance NORSOF’s efficacy in 
counterinsurgency operations? This discussion will be centered on doctrine, operational 
concepts, training, and TTPs. I will not discuss possible organizational changes to 
NORSOF as this issue already has been succinctly analyzed.16 Then follows a discussion 
of question four: What are the limitations concerning NORSOF’s roles or capabilities 
 regarding counterinsurgency? This question is of particular interest given Norway’s 
relatively small military. Finally, I will end this chapter with a conclusion and some 
recommendations as well as some suggestions for future research. 
                                                 
16 See Tom Robertsen, Making New Ambitions Work: The Transformation of Norwegian Special 
Operations Forces (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007). 
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D. ON LITERATURE 
The principal method used to answer these questions consists of reviewing 
existing former and current doctrines and practices as well as literature on the subject. 
Both national and allied doctrines are essential in this examination. Likewise, both 
national practice and that of other countries will be analyzed. As for academic literature 
on the subject, James J. Witz in 1988 commented that: “Compared to the sustained 
attention given to nuclear strategy and large scale conventional wars, academic interest in 
counterinsurgency has been sporadic, even though low-intensity conflict has been 
common throughout the postwar era.”17 Since then, however, internationally both SOF 
and counterinsurgency have been the subject of a growing academic interest. As for SOF, 
the 1992 Gulf War was a watershed. Before then, SOF was not universally recognized as 
a force of particular value except for very specific missions. Largely because of the 
successes of U.S. and UK SOF in this war, this view changed in the aftermath of this 
conflict resulting in that today, most Western countries value their SOF not only as 
among their most prestigious units, but very often also as perhaps their most versatile and 
useful military tool. As for counterinsurgency, this has historically only been given 
sporadic attention, and then usually related to the British experience in Malaya, the 
French experiences in Indochina and Algeria, and the American experience in Vietnam. 
The recent GWOT with the ensuing insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq has, however, 
spawned an abundance of literature on the subject. 
Nationally, however, the situation must be categorized as somewhat bleaker. On 
the one hand, due to NORSOF’s deployments to various conflicts, beginning in the mid-
1990s, NORSOF has become increasingly visible in the national media.18 Moreover, 
since then, NORSOF has also been increasingly elevated in importance in, e.g., national 
                                                 
17 James J. Wirtz, “Counterinsurgency Paradigms,” International Security Vol. 14, No. 1. (Summer, 
1989): 184.  
18 Robertsen, 14. 
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whitepapers.19 Interestingly, this does not seem to have led to a thorough professional or 
academic debate about NORSOF and its roles in contemporary conflicts.20 The media 
have on their part mostly focused on the secrecy that normally has surrounded these 
operations. Another subject has been the speculations by some politicians about possible 
operational misuse of NORSOF while deployed. As for the national defense and political 
documents, these have mostly focused on organizational issues like a possible merge of 
the different units, base localization, the units’ size etc.; and to a lesser degree about what 
roles NORSOF should play as part of the military component of statecraft. 
Partly as a result of secrecy, and partly because of the lack of public debate, both 
academically and military professionally, there is very little written not only about 
NORSOF in a strategic context but also about NORSOF’s tactical experiences in the 
Balkans and Afghanistan or the two units’ history. One exception to the latter is a book 
on Norwegian Naval Diving, written by a former frogman, Erling Krange which includes 
the early history of the naval component of NORSOF. Another exception is a book about 
NORSOF written by the journalist Tom Bakkeli in 2007. Although the latter book 
describes various aspects of NORSOF’s training, operations, etc., this book will not be 
used as a source as it is an unofficial account which is not endorsed by the NAF. A better 
source is the monograph “Making New Ambitions Work: The Transformation of 
Norwegian Special Operations Forces,” written by Tom Robertsen and published by the 
Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies.21 In this monograph the author examines 
NORSOF’s history, roles and missions, and more importantly, how NORSOF best can 
transform to meet today’s security environment. As for a Norwegian scholarly debate of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency, this can best be described as almost non existent. One 
                                                 
19 See for example: Forsvarsdepartementet; Forsvarssjefens militærfaglige utredning 2003 [Defense 
Study 2003], Forsvarsnett (Norwegian Defense [online 21 May 2008]), 11; Forsvarsdepartementet, 
”Relevant Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces”, Regjeringen, 2004 (Ministry of 
Defense [Online 25 Jan 2008]), 74; Forsvarsdepartementet, Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i 
perioden 2005-2008, 55-56; Forsvarsdepartementet; Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og 
verdier, 74. 
20 One notable exception is: Magne Rødahl and Erik Dokken, “Norske Spesialstyrker I fremtidige 
internasjonale fredsoperasjoner” [Norwegian Special Operations Forces in Future International Peace 
Operations], Norsk Militært Tidsskrift [Norwegian Military Review], No. 10, 1998, 4-13.  
21 Robertsen. 
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exception is the scholar Nils Marius Rekkedal who has published some on irregular 
warfare and asymmetric warfare. A cursory review of Norsk Militært Tidskrift 
(Norwegian Military Journal), which is the most prominent Norwegian defense 
magazine, reveals, for example, only one article on insurgency and counterinsurgency.22  
As a corollary to the relatively sparsely Norwegian literature on NORSOF and 
counterinsurgency, I will therefore have to mainly draw upon international literature and 
other countries’ experiences, most notable the United States, the United Kingdom and 
France as these countries since 1945 have gained considerable experience in fighting 
insurgencies, and thus have fostered analysts and writers with a thorough knowledge of 
the subject at hand. Although these and similar countries vary greatly from Norway with 
regard to foreign policy, size of military forces, capabilities, etc., I will argue that it is 
possible to induce certain principles from these countries’ traditions and experiences, 
some of which will also apply to Norway in general and NORSOF in specific. Or as the 
scholar Bard E. O’Neill nicely put it: “Those responsible for counterinsurgency strategy 
and planning can thus benefit enormously from serious study and analysis of other 
governments’ experiences.”23  
                                                 
22 Rekkedal, 22-27. 
23 O’Neill, 188. 
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II. NORWAY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 
A. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
When writing on the subject of this study, one of the first problems one encounter 
concerns the matter of terminology. Small wars, low-intensity conflicts, asymmetrical 
warfare, unconventional warfare (UW), irregular warfare (IW), guerrilla warfare, and 
counterinsurgency are but a few of the terms that have been used to describe the matter at 
hand. Although they all have some differences, they also share some common traits. Thus 
the various policy makers, analysts and authors seem to choose terms based on the 
subject under investigation, the era it is written in, as well as their own preferences. 
Consequently, at times the terms have been used helter-skelter and thus resulting in some 
confusion. It is therefore pertinent to briefly describe the aforementioned terms. This 
being said, given the length of this study, it is not possible to neither give a detailed 
description of them nor to outline all their various meanings. 
In 1906 Colonel Charles C. E. Callwell advised in his classic book “Small Wars: 
Their Principles and Practice” that: “The expression “small war” has in reality no 
particular connection with the scale on which any campaign may be carried out; it is 
simply used to denote, in default of a better, operations of regular armies against 
irregular, or comparatively irregular forces.”24 As the twentieth century progressed, with 
two world wars and the ensuing Cold War; colonial wars, which Small Wars initially was 
written for, large and conventional wars between nation states became more dominant. 
However, with the rise in wars of independence in the wake of the Second World War; 
when classifying the conflict as a small war or not, the scale of the conflict was usually 
more determining than the type of forces involved. The reason for this was that this era 
was characterized by the bipolarization of the world, with large conventional forces on 
each side facing each other. As a corollary to this, any conflict where national survival of 
 
                                                 
24 Charles, E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Lincoln and London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1996), 21. 
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 the major contending parties was not at stake was therefore usually inhibited in some 
way or another by one or both sides in order not to provoke a major conflict. 
Consequently these conflicts were often coined “small wars.”  
Another common term for such conflicts in the latter half of the twentieth century 
is “low-intensity conflict.” The idea behind this term is usually that wars of liberation, 
etc., were normally of lesser intensity than a possible war between the main contenders in 
this East vs. West competition. The metrics for intensity was usually casualties on each 
side, and this was often set to be 1,000.25     
Asymmetrical warfare is also often used to denote this form of conflict. This term 
refers to the fact that irregular forces like insurgents because of their weakness relative to 
their opponents usually employs a strategy, doctrine or TTPs that are asymmetric 
compared to that of their opponents. Thus, the insurgents compensate for some of their 
weakness. I will, however, argue that asymmetrical warfare in this context is more a way 
of waging war than a form of war.  
UW is another often used term and it has several connotations. The scholar Hy S. 
Rothstein employs it as a generic term to the variety of ambiguous ill-defined smaller 
scale-conflicts that often straddles between an uneasy peace and not quite war.26 Central 
to Rothstein’s definition is that these conflicts do not follow the conventions of military 
conflict characterized by head on engagements by large state controlled conventional 
military formations following the established conventions for the conduct of warfare. 
U.S. doctrine, on the other hand, defines UW slightly differently.27  
 
                                                 
25 See, for example: Frank R. Pfetsch & Christoph Rohloff, “Kosimo: A Databank on Political 
Conflict,” Journal of Peaceresearch Vol 37, no 3, 2000: 379-389. 
26 Rothstein, 16. 
27 See Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, electronic edition as amended 
through 31 August 2005. 
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Guerrilla Warfare28 is also a term that has been used extensively to denote the 
subject under investigation. It is a form of warfare, meaning a technique or method used 
to pursue an objective.29 This objective has usually been to overthrow a regime and seize 
the power. Guerrilla warfare is usually employed by small bands of irregulars fighting a 
superior army and thus has to rely on asymmetry to outweigh this disadvantage. It has 
been the preferred method of seizing power by such diverse revolutionaries as Mao Tse-
tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, to mention but a few of the most 
notorious ones. 
Irregular Warfare30 is another old term that recently has come into vogue again, 
much thanks to the recently published U.S. Multi-Service Concept for Irregular 
Warfare.31 This concept sees IW as“…an armed political struggle for power, and it must 
be met by an armed political counter.”32 More importantly from a Norwegian 
perspective, however, is that the latest version of Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine 
(Norwegian Joint Doctrine), issued in 2007, for the first time describes IW. This doctrine 
lists IW as one of four types of operations the NAF must be able to conduct abroad. 
Although this updated version of the Norwegian Joint Doctrine does not define IW 
specifically, it gives a brief description of what it means by irregular forces, their tactic 
and how they may be combated. Moreover, it points out that although fighting irregular 
forces may fall within the category described as stability operations, this doctrine 
considers it as its own category of operations because the level of force required 
generally will be more extensive than what is the case in stability operations.33 
                                                 
28 For a good account of the history of guerrilla warfare, see among other Azeem Ibrahim, 
“Conceptualization of Guerrilla Warfare,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 2004) 112-
124. 
29 Ibrahim, 112. 
30 For a discussion of irregular warfare see among other Colin S. Gray, “Irregular Warfare: One 
Nature, Many Characters,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Winter 2007): 35-46. 
31 U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command and U.S. Special Operations Command Center 
for Knowledge and Futures. Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare, August 2006. 
32 Ibid., iii. 
33 Forsvarsstaben, Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine [Joint Doctrine] (Oslo, 2007), 28. 
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Insurgency and counterinsurgency are also commonly used designations that 
describe the subject of this study. An insurgent movement, according to the Norwegian 
Joint Doctrine is “…an organized force which seeks power centrally or regionally.”34 
Moreover, this doctrine considers insurgent movements as a subcategory of irregular 
forces, and, consequently, counterinsurgency is a subset of IW. NATO defines operations 
against insurgent movements as counterinsurgency operations.35 Counterinsurgency 
operations combine military, diplomatic and economic means which are directed towards 
combating the movement, its external support and support from the local populace.36 
Although all the previously described terms share common traits and thus to a large 
degree are overlapping, insurgency and counterinsurgency are the terms that I find most 
useful when discussing the subject of this investigation. Consequently, I will use these 
terms throughout this study.  
Insurgency is defined as: “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a 
constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”.37  
Counterinsurgency is defined as: “Those military, paramilitary, political, 
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat 
insurgency.”38 
To summarize, the above list of terms serve as the basis for a discussion of the 
types of operations that NORSOF will inevitably be tasked to conduct.  The lack of 
precision, limited clarity, and wide-spread contestation over what these terms mean are 
illustrative of the ambiguous and dynamic nature of the types of warfare that Norway’s 
defense community will face in the 21st Century. 
                                                 
34 Forsvarsstaben, Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine, 42. 
35 Ibid., 42. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Joint Publication 1-02, 1-104; NATO: AAP-6 (2007), 2-I-5. 
38 Joint Publication 1-02, 1-47; AAP-6, NATO Terms and Glossary of Definitions, (Mons: NATO, 
2007), 2-C-17. (NATO’s definition varies slightly from the American definition in that NATO has left out 
the words “by a government” and thus has broadened the definition somewhat.) 
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B. IS THERE A NEED FOR A NORSOF COUNTERINSURGENCY 
CAPABILITY? 
When answering this question, I find it instructive to first briefly analyze the 
current and future security environment. Second, it is imperative to investigate Norway’s 
goals and ambitions with its security and defense policy. Finally, I will examine the 
Allied need for a NORSOF counterinsurgency capability.   
As alluded to in the introduction, the latter half of the twentieth century saw far 
more intra-state wars than inter-state wars. In their study of civil war, the scholars James 
Fearon and David Laitin39 found that between 1945 and 1999, there were 25 interstate 
wars40 resulting in a total of about 3.33 million battle deaths. These wars involved just 25 
states and had a median duration of not quite 3 months. In contrast, in the same period 
there were roughly 127 civil wars41, 25 of them were ongoing in 1999 alone. It is 
estimated that the total number of dead as a direct result of these conflicts is 16.2 million, 
five times the interstate toll. These civil wars occurred in 73 states – more than a third of 
the UN system – and had a median duration of roughly 6 years.42 Even though not all of 
the conflicts listed as civil wars can be classified as insurgencies, many can. Moreover, 
this statistic on civil war does not reflect all the refugees these conflicts produced, a 
number far greater than their death toll and far greater than the refuge flows associated 
with the inter-state wars. The point being made by Fearon and Laitin is that intra state 
war and thus insurgency, is a far greater scourge than conventional interstate war.  
Further complicating this situation is the role played by globalization, which since 
the mid-1970s have grown in importance and today affects literally all countries. Even 
though many view globalization as beneficial, not all do and some may even turn to 
violence in attempt to counter it, as demonstrated by the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
movements. Globalization also implies that events in one part of the world increasingly 
                                                 
39 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 75-90. 
40 Interstate wars that killed at least 1,000. 
41 Civil wars with at least 1,000 killed. 
42 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 75. 
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have consequences for individuals and societies in other parts of the world.43 
Globalization has also resulted in, although indirectly, that human rights and value of 
human life have grown in importance and today are viewed as concepts that should have 
universal applicability. As a corollary to the aforementioned, a violent conflict within one 
country may have far reaching consequences and may lead to other states or the world 
community intervening on for example humanitarian grounds. The Balkan Wars in the 
1990s and today’s conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are illustrious cases in point.  
When investigating Norway’s goals and ambitions in its security and defense 
policy, it is natural to start with an analysis of “Relevant Force: Strategic Concept for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces.”44 This strategic concept sets the security and defense policy 
framework for the doctrines and operational activities for the NAF in the period 2005-
2008. This concept acknowledges that as a result of the changed security environment, 
“Norway must be prepared to contribute to establish the necessary degree of control in 
many conflicts, both on humanitarian grounds and in order to safeguarding our own, and 
international, security and stability.”45 Relevant Force also states that Norway has five 
fundamental security policy objectives of which the second is: “…to contribute to peace, 
stability and the further development of the international rule of law”.46 As a link 
between its security and defense policy, Norway has also established four defense policy 
objectives, of which the second states that the NAF shall be able to: “together with Allies, 
through participation in multinational peace operations and international defence 
cooperation, contribute to peace, stability, the enforcement of international law and 
respect for human rights...”47 This concept also tasks the NAF to contribute to 
international crisis management, including multinational peace operations. It further 
states that: 
                                                 
43 Forsvarsdepartementet, ”Relevant Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces,” 14. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 29. 
46 Ibid., 48. 
47 Ibid., 60. 
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The NAF shall, within the limits of international law, be able to contribute 
military capabilities in order to impose control over situations that either 
threaten our common security or vital interests, or have other unacceptable 
consequences. Such crisis management might include all kinds of security 
related challenges, in principle take place anywhere in the world, and be 
led by organizations such as the UN, NATO and the EU, or be carried out 
by coalitions of limited duration.48  
It is also imperative to note that the use of Norwegian military forces must have 
basis in international law, and in cases other than self defense, normally must be based on 
a UN mandate. Moreover, this concept also advises that:  
The NAF will focus on being capable of handling a broad range of 
challenges, both nationally and internationally. The NAF must be 
structured in such a way as to be able to undertake all tasks in the most 
comprehensive, adequate and forward-looking manner, and with the 
inherent flexibility that uncertainty requires.49 
This is also supported by more recent government whitepapers, like for example 
Parliamentary Bill no. 48.50 
In this regard it is also imperative to note the elevated importance of NORSOF 
within the NAF. Today NORSOF is not only as a national joint strategic asset, it is also 
considered as one of Norway’s niche capabilities that represents the specialized units that 
are in demand in the Alliance.51 
Although this strategic concept was promulgated by an earlier government, the 
present Government does not seem to have major issues with this concept.52 The present 
government states that it wants modern armed forces, adapted to the new security 
challenges, and, moreover, that new and compounded threats increase the need for 
                                                 
48 Forsvarsdepartementet, ”Relevant Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces,” 64. 
49 Ibid., 70. 
50 Forsvarsdepartementet; Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier, 13. 
51 Forsvarsdepartenemtet, ”Relevant Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces,” 73-
74; Forsvarsdepartementet; Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier, 63, 74. 
52 This government has among other things put more emphasis on Northern Norway and adjacent 
areas; a more pronounced role for the UN, and thus enhanced Norwegian participation in UN operations.     
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flexible armed forces that can manage a wide variety of tasks.53 Norway shall also 
strengthen its effort in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Norway will thus 
enhance its civilian and military involvement in UN’s peacekeeping operations, 
especially in Africa. As for Afghanistan, the Norwegian participation in ISAF shall be 
strengthened, and thus the Norwegian mandate for OEF will not be renewed.54 
NATO is a cornerstone of Norwegian security policy, and NATO’s tasks are 
therefore also applicable to Norway. Relevant Force advises that “[it] is of utmost 
importance that Norway is capable of contributing actively, to ensure that NATO is in a 
position to carry out the total range of its security tasks in a credible manner.”55 Norway 
has therefore contributed forces, including NORSOF to NATO’s new reaction force 
(NRF) since its establishment in 2003. It is also imperative to note that the “…use of 
force by Norway in a purely national context is first and foremost an option in limited 
situations, connected to the exercise of national sovereignty and authority. In all other 
situations, the NAF will operate within a multinational framework – both inside and 
outside of Norway”.56  As a corollary to this, Norway must be prepared to undertake 
operations under the auspices of the UN and NATO. However, as both of these two 
organizations are adapting to the changed security environment with irregular threats like 
insurgencies, international terrorism, etc., being dominant, Norwegian forces is likely to 
find itself in a peace enforcement operation facing an insurgent movement posing an 
irregular threat. NORSOF’s operations in Afghanistan are illustrious cases in point. 
Moreover, with the present government’s focus on Africa, and Sudan in particular, this 
scenario is also highly likely in the future.  
 
                                                 
53 Regjeringen [The Government], ”Soria Moria erklæringen: Plattform for regjeringssamarbeide 
mellom Arbeiderpartiet, Sosialistisk Ventreparti og Senterpartiet 2005-09 [The Soria Moria Declaration: 
the Basis for Governmental Collaboration between the Labour Party, Socialist Left Party and the Center 
Party 2005-09],” Regjeringen 13 Oct 2005 [Online]. 
54 Ibid. 
55Forsvarsdepartementet, ”Relevant Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces,” 33-
34.  
56 Ibid., 56. 
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When trying to predict the need for future Norwegian military operations abroad, I find it 
instructive to also investigate former and current operations. Thus, one might be able to 
see if there are some trends that may indicate what the future will bring. After the Second 
World War, Norway has participated in a number of different conflicts around the world. 
A selected number of these may broadly be divided into four categories: 
 
Table 2.1. Selected Norwegian Military Deployments57 
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As this table depicts, all Norwegian deployments have been under the auspices of 
the UN, NATO or a major power. Moreover, it seems clear that with the exception of the 
“German Brigade” in West-Germany, there is a trend in that the commitments have 
moved from being mainly smaller commitments of for example individual UN observers 
to larger formations (in a Norwegian context). Also, while the deployed personnel earlier 
often mostly were reservists or a mix of reservists and active duty personnel, today the 
personnel is almost exclusively active duty.  
 
                                                 
57 For a comprehensive discussion of Norwegian commitments see among others: Kjetil Skogrand, 
Norsk forsvarshistorie: alliert i krig og fred , bind 4 [Norwegian Defense History: Allied in War and Peace, 
Vol. 4], (Norway, Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004), and Jacob Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth and Rolf Tamnes,  
Norsk forsvarshistorie: allianseforsvar i endring, bind 5 [Norwegian Defense History: Alliance Defense in 
change, Vol. 5], (Norway, Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004). 
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There also seems to be a change in types of operations as well as operational 
environments.  Although it is difficult to precisely classify these operations due to their 

















Figure 2.1. Types of Operation vs. Environment for Selected Norwegian 
Commitments 
 
Figure 2-1 indicates that there has been a shift from mostly peace-keeping 
operations in a permissive environment to peace-keeping operations in semi or non-
permissive environment and more lately a shift to peace-enforcement operations in semi 
or non-permissive environment. Although this figure does not depict it, in most of these 
operations either one or both of the fighting parties to some degree have been constituted 
by irregular forces. It therefore seems reasonable to infer that future Norwegian military 
commitments are likely to be peace-enforcement operations in a semi or non-permissive 
environment with a large influx of irregular forces.  
 
 21
As this discussion illustrates, today’s security environment is highly complex and 
characterized by unconventional threats which may require Norway to commit its 
military forces as part of a multinational coalition. NORSOF is one of the forces likely to 
be deployed due to their specialization, robustness, and utility. Consequently, in the 
future, NORSOF is therefore likely to find itself in a counterinsurgency operation, like 
the one that has been going on in Afghanistan since early 2002, or in another conflict in 
another country.   
 22
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III. CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY 
A. TYPES OF INSURGENCY 
As previously noted, a conflict is characterized as an insurgency when an 
organized movement aims at overthrowing a constituted government through the use of 
subversion and armed conflict. It can thus be described as a strategy adopted by groups 
either unable or unwilling to attain political objectives through normal means. The central 
issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is therefore political power, and, 
consequently, each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as 
legitimate. Insurgents on their part, “…use all available tools – political (including 
diplomatic), informational (including appeals to religious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs), 
military, and economic – to overthrow the existing authority”.58 As a corollary to this, the 
reason for the insurrection is that the insurgents perceive the ruling group as illegitimate. 
This illegitimacy may be perceived or real, and may be the result of various conditions. 
The scholar Bard E. O’Neill suggests four major aspects of politics as the genesis of 
insurrection.59 First, the political community, which normally is equivalent to the nation-
state, may be perceived as illegitimate because major ethnic or religious groups may have 
been divided because of artificially drawn borders, and thus lives in an area that are ruled 
by a rival group. Second, there may be discord over the political system which O’Neill 
divides into traditional autocracy, modernizing autocracy, totalitarian, and pluralistic. 
Third, some specific individuals within the polity may be considered illegitimate because 
their behavior is inconsistent with existing values and norms, or because they are viewed 
as corrupt, ineffective, or oppressive.60 Finally, the policies itself may be contested and 
 
 
                                                 
58 DA FM 3-24. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 2. 
59 O’Neill, 15. 
60 Ibid., 19. 
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 insurgents may use violence to change existing social, economic, or political policies 
which they may believe are discriminate. Insurgents may consider any or all of these 
illegitimate, and, according to O’Neill, it makes a great deal of difference precisely which 
one is at stake.61  
Closely related to the underlying causes for the insurrection is what type of 
insurrection one faces. It is therefore imperative to ascertain the insurgents’ long-term 
goals. As the scholars Metz & Millen have noted, very broadly there are two forms of 
insurgency, “national” insurgency and “liberation” insurgency.62 In the former, the 
insurgents oppose the regime because of distinctions based on class, ideology, identity 
(ethnicity, race, religion) or other political factors. In the latter, the insurgents are 
opposing a regime which is seen as an outside occupier. The goal of the insurgents is thus 
to “liberate” their nation from the outside occupier. The German occupation of Norway 
and the subsequent resistance fight being an example of the latter. An insurgency can 
contain elements of both, and may even shift from one form to another during its 
lifespan. More importantly, liberation insurgencies are more difficult to counter, due to 
the fact that the regime (the occupier) usually has little legitimacy and the population 
strongly supports the insurgents, thus giving them an advantage.  
Bard O’Neill differentiates insurgency even further, and suggests nine types of 
insurgent movements: anarchists, egalitarians, traditionalists, pluralists, apocalyptic-
utopians, secessionists, reformists, preservationists, and commercialists.63 Anarchists 
believe that all authority patterns are unnecessary and illegitimate; political systems 
should therefore be destroyed and not replaced. The Greek 17 November organization is 
an example of such a group.  
Egalitarian insurgents seek to impose a new system “based on the ultimate value 
of distributional equality and centrally controlled structures designed to mobilize the 
 
                                                 
61 O’Neill, 15. 
62 Metz and Millen, 6-7. 
63 O’Neill, 20. 
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people and radically transform the social structure within an existing political 
community.”64 The Shining Path in Peru and the New People’s Army in the Philippines 
are examples of egalitarian movements.  
Traditionalists, however, seek to “establish political structures characterized by 
limited or guided participation and low autonomy, with political power in the hands of an 
autocratic leader supported by economic, military, and clerical leaders.”65 Many of 
today’s Islamic militant groups such as al-Qaeda fall within this category.  
Some movements like the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect can best be labeled as 
Apocalyptic-Utopian. They envisage establishing a world order – sometimes involving 
divine intervention – as the result of an apocalypse precipitated by their acts of 
terrorism.66  
The last category of insurgents who seek revolutionary change of the political 
system is the pluralists. “Pluralist insurgents aim to establish a system that emphasize the 
values of individual freedom, liberty, and compromise and in which political structures 
are differentiated and autonomous.”67 The African National Congress (ANC) which 
fought against apartheid in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s belong in this category. 
The sixth type, the secessionist or separatist insurgent movements have been 
among the most notable insurgents in the post World War Two era. Secessionists either 
seek to form their own nation-state or to join another. The Vietminh in Indochina is an 
example of the former and the Albanian National Liberation Army in Macedonia is an 
example of the latter.  
 
 
                                                 
64 O’Neill, 20. 
65 Ibid., 21. 
66 Ibid., 23. 
67 Ibid., 25. 
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The seventh type of insurgency is the reformist, and these insurgents target 
policies that determine distribution of the economic, psychological, and political benefits 
that society has to offer. The Zapatistas in Mexico who fight for Indian rights are a case 
in point.  
Another type of insurgents are the preservationists who differ from the other 
categories in that they carry out illegal acts of violence against non-ruling groups and 
authorities that are trying to effect change. Preservationists are essentially oriented 
towards maintaining the status quo because of the privileges they derive from it, and the 
American Ku Klux Klan is an infamous example of such an organization.  
The last category of insurgent group according to O’Neill is one that Steven Metz 
has called commercial insurgents.68 Their aim seems to be the acquisition of materiel 
resources through seizure and control of political power. Thus, they consider political 
legitimacy to be relatively unimportant and focus on coercive power. As an example of 
this type of movement, O’Neill points to the noxious Revolutionary United Front in 
Sierra Leone. 
It is also worth noting that O’Neill points to five problems that often complicate 
identifying types of insurgent movements.69 First, some insurgent movements change 
their goals during the conflict. Second, there may be conflicting goals, as when distinct 
groups or factions of an insurgent movement have different, sometimes mutually 
exclusive goals. Third, the insurgents are frequently masking their ultimate goals by 
democratic rhetoric. O’Neill therefore advises that it is imperative to examine how 
insurgents conduct their own political affairs. Fourth, the insurgents’ goals may be 
ambiguous, as when two or more aims may be evident, neither of which clearly 
predominates. The fifth problem originates in the tendency to confuse the intermediate 
and ultimate strategic aims of insurgents.   
                                                 
68 Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
December 10, 1993), 13-15. 
69 O’Neill, 29-31. 
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Notwithstanding the differences between types of insurgencies and the problems 
related to classify them accordingly, the new U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
counterinsurgency manual nicely sums it up when it states that insurgencies “…normally 
seek to achieve one of two goals: to overthrow the existing social order and to reallocate 
power within a single state, or to break away from state control and form an autonomous 
entity or ungoverned space they can control.”70 
B. INSURGENT STRATEGIES 
Insurgency, as earlier noted, is a strategy used by a challenging group to gain 
power. Various analysts of insurgency have classified insurgent strategies differently. In 
this study I use Bard E. O’Neill’s framework which also is very similar to the one used in 
the new U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency manual. O’Neill has identified 
four broad strategic approaches commonly used by insurgents as well as a fifth strategy 
that is still evolving.71 The first strategy is called the conspiratorial one, and it seeks to 
remove the ruling authorities through a limited but swift use of force.72 This strategy 
encompasses revolution and plot (coup d’état), as described by David Galula, himself an 
astute veteran of counterinsurgency, in his seminal book “Counterinsurgency Warfare: 
Theory and Practice”.73 The Bolshevik insurrection in Russia in 1917, being an example 
of the former; the many military coups that have plagued many African and Latin 
American countries, being examples of the latter. 
The second strategy is the protracted war strategy as articulated by Mao Tse-
tung74 is not only the most conceptually elaborate strategy but also, perhaps, the most 
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71 O’Neill, 45-63. 
72 Ibid., 46. 
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widely copied one.75 This strategy outlines a three-phased, politico-military approach.76 
The phases are sequential but overlapping, and each phase differs with respect to the 
correlation of forces. In phase one, the strategic defensive, the enemy has a stronger 
correlation of forces and the insurgents must concentrate on survival and building 
support. As the insurgents gradually gain support and military strength, they enter the 
second and longest phase which Mao termed the strategic stalemate. This phase starts 
when the force correlations approach equilibrium and it is characterized mainly by 
guerrilla warfare. As the success of the insurgents lead to demoralization, lethargy, and 
defections on the enemy side, the final phase, the strategic offensive starts. In this phase 
the insurgents have superior strength and move from guerrilla operations to conventional 
operations in order to destroy the enemy’s military capability. It is imperative to note that 
Mao’s strategy of protracted popular war does not require a sequential or complete 
application of all three stages.77 The aim is to seize political power; if the government’s 
will and capability collapse early in the progress, so much the better. If the insurgents are 
unsuccessful in a later stage, they might revert to an earlier phase. This flexibility partly 
explains why this strategy has become so popular, especially in many Third World 
countries. In contrast to Mao, however, who downplayed terrorism and focused almost 
exclusively on guerrilla warfare in the rural areas where the insurgents “swam like fish in 
the sea,” other movements like the Vietcong in Vietnam, the New Peoples Army in the 
Philippines and the Shining Path in Peru have concluded that greater violence in the cities 
and more use of terrorism were necessary.78 
The third strategy, the military-focus strategy, is similar to the protracted war 
strategy in that it may involve a protracted struggle. However, it differs fundamentally 
because it gives primacy to military action and subordinates political action.79 Followers 
of this strategy believe that popular support is either sufficient or will be a by-product of 
                                                 
75 O’Neill, 49. 
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77 DA FM 3-24. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 13. 
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military victories. Examples of this approach according to O’Neill are the South during 
the American Civil War and the Biafran Civil War. A variant of the military-focus 
strategy, the focoist, was developed during the Cuban insurrection and popularized by 
among other Che Guevara.80 Central to these revolutionaries was the notion that an 
insurrection itself can create the conditions needed to overthrow the government. A small 
group of guerrillas (the foco),81 catalyzing on existing grievances “…would “jump start” 
the campaign to overthrow the standing government trough the power of example.”82    
The fourth approach is the urban-warfare strategy in which terrorist attacks play a 
preponderant role. This approach is a response to the growing urbanization in many parts 
of the world which has forced many insurgents to locate in the cities. Central to this 
strategy, according to Carlos Marighella, one of its foremost proponents, is to perform 
violent acts that will force the regime into repression, which again will lead to the 
alienation of masses that will then revolt against the army and the regime, and then blame 
them for the state of things.83 There are also two variations of this strategy: one that 
focuses solely on the cities and one that calls for a move to the countryside. History has 
showed that the latter is imperative if popular support is to be gained. This strategy of 
urban-warfare has been pursued by various terrorist organizations, like the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and the French Action Direct. This approach has rarely been 
successful. The regimes have either been able to crush the insurgent movements, or the 
movements’ ultimate goals. Cases in point are the previously mentioned European 
terrorist organizations, which have continued their violent acts, but with little chance of 
achieving their goals.84 
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Finally, O’Neill suggests that there may be a fifth insurgent strategy being 
developed, as exemplified by the al-Qaeda network. Its main focus is not concentrated 
within the borders of a given country, which is a break with earlier insurgencies. 
Although al-Qaeda may not have fully developed an overall strategy for conducting an 
insurgency, O’Neill notes that the strategy of al-Qaeda is best viewed as a military-focus 
one with a global theater of operations.85 
It is important to note that Bard O’Neill warns that the strategic approaches are 
not always clear-cut. They may for example not be applied precisely the way they were 
originally articulated, and, moreover, insurgent movements may be divided into 
independent groups which may pursue several strategies simultaneously. The key 
questions for the analyst are therefore “…whether there is a lack of consensus on 
strategy, what the conflicting strategies are, what actions take place, and what effects of 
the discordant behavior are.”86 
C. MOBILIZATION MEANS AND CAUSES 
As should be clear now, an insurgency is a competition between insurgent and 
government for political control and legitimacy. As David Galula succinctly put it “…the 
battle for the population is a major characteristic of the revolutionary war.”87 In other 
words, both insurgent and government seek the support of the civilian population while 
discouraging support for their adversaries. Two important aspects of this effort are 
mobilization means and causes. 
There are several ways of classifying the mobilizing means the insurgents may 
use. Again I find Bard E. O’Neill’s framework instructive. According to him, insurgents 
usually employ one or several of the following seven methods to gain the desired support 
and recruits.88 
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One way of mobilizing popular support is through charismatic attraction.89 In 
certain cases, assertive individuals emerge as the clearly identifiable leaders of insurgent 
movements. When they are perceived to have supernatural qualities or when they 
manifest captivating oratorical skills and a forceful personality, such leaders may 
motivate others to join their cause through their example and persuasiveness.90  Examples 
of such leaders are Vladimir Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro, and more recently, 
Osama bin Laden.  
Another mobilizing means is to use esoteric and exoteric appeals. Esoteric appeals 
are directed primarily at the intellectual stratum and seek to “…clarify environmental 
conditions by putting them in a theoretical context that has neat, orderly interpretations 
and explanations for all perceived social, economic, and political ‘realities’.”91 These 
theoretical contexts are ideological in nature and can be either secular or sacred and 
purport to explain the past, present and to predict the future. A classic example of a 
secular ideology is Marxism-Leninism with its focus on class struggles which eventually 
would lead to a utopian future devoid of exploitation and alienation. Exoteric appeals, on 
the other hand, focuses on the concrete grievances of both the intelligentsia and the 
masses. Exoteric appeals are essential for the acquisition of popular support from the 
masses, as pointed out by Mao. 
When esoteric and exoteric appeals do not yield expected support, insurgents may 
use terrorism to demonstrate the government’s weaknesses and thus gain popular support. 
Use of this means, however, implies the risk of alienating potential domestic and 
international supporters. The Malayan Communist Party and the IRA both suffered 
defections and loss of popular support because of their indiscriminate actions.    
Another often used means of gaining support is to provoke government 
repression, as demonstrated by the Algerians in their fight against the French colonial 
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power. “Excessive violence by military and police units – an all-to frequent occurrence in 
insurrections – and government-sponsored vigilantes (death squads) is generally 
recognized as a factor accounting for increased support for insurgents in many cases…”92  
Another technique to gain support is for the insurgents to demonstrate potency. 
This approach has two dimensions: meeting the needs of the people and gaining military 
initiative. By establishing an administrative apparatus (shadow government) that provides 
social services like schools, health clinics, etc., the insurgents not only manifest their own 
presence, but also demonstrate the failure of the government. The Palestinian Hamas 
organization is a case in point. By gaining military initiative, the insurgents create the 
impression that the insurgency has momentum and will succeed. 
Coercion is also often used, especially against that part of the population that is 
unresponsive to the other mobilizing means. This is the least effective method because it 
causes resentment and therefore weak commitment of those who are directly 
victimized.93 
In addition to the means of mobilization described by O’Neill, the new U.S. 
counterinsurgency manual adds two more means: foreign support and apolitical 
motivations. Foreign regimes can “…provide the expertise, international legitimacy, and 
money needed to start or intensify a conflict.”94 Insurgencies may also attract criminals, 
mercenaries, individuals inspired by the romanticized image of the revolutionary or holy 
warrior, as well as others who imagine themselves as fighters for the cause.95 It is 
imperative to note that political solutions are probably not sufficient for individuals in 
this category to end the fighting.  
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Closely related to the means or techniques for gaining popular support is the need 
for a cause. As Davis Galula wisely advised, “[t]he first basic need for an insurgent who 
aims more than simply making trouble is an attractive cause…”96 With a cause, the 
insurgent has a formidable asset that he can turn into concrete strength. Moreover, Galula 
noted that: “[t]he best cause for the insurgent’s purpose is one that, by definition, can 
attract the largest number of supporters and repel the minimum of opponents.”97 Also, a 
good cause is one that the counterinsurgent cannot espouse, without risking loosing his 
power, which after all, is what he is fighting for. Finally, Galula noted that a good cause 
“…must be lasting, if not for the duration of the revolutionary war, at least until the 
insurgent movement is well on its feet.”98  The insurgents’ cause is usually rooted in one 
or more local real or perceived grievances of either political, social, economic, racial, 
religious, or cultural character. In some cases the cause may even be artificial, as it may 
be made up by the insurgents. 
This said, it is pertinent to note that an insurgency may be viewed through two 
different “lenses.”  A prevalent view, as advocated by among other the prominent 
analysts David Galula and Bard E. O’Neill, focuses on what can be called the “narrative 
paradigm.” Central to this paradigm is that individuals frame the insurgency so that it 
reflects their view on history, culture, etc. Thus, peoples’ decisions are shaped by this 
image. A common assumption in the narrative paradigm is therefore that social 
grievances are one of the most important root causes for insurgencies. Another view, 
which is less prevalent, can be labeled the “rational paradigm.”  This paradigm 
emphasizes that individuals are thinking beings that make rational decisions based on risk 
and expected value. A common assumption in this paradigm is that economic 
development is a crucial factor in insurgencies.99 These two paradigms are in somewhat 
contrast to each other as they offer different views on what the root causes of insurgency 
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are, how people act, and how best to combat it. As a corollary to this, when analyzing 
insurgency, one must not only take into account those aspect of human behavior which 
are identity originated, but also those aspects that are economically based.   
D. OTHER ASPECTS OF INSURGENCY 
When characterizing insurgency, the scholars Steven Metz and Raymond Millen 
succinctly described it when they said that insurgency is characterized by “…protracted, 
asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, urban 
areas), psychological warfare and political mobilization…”100 By this they meant that 
insurgencies are usually protracted as the insurgent forces very often use time to their 
advantage (as long as one avoids defeat, one has not lost). The relationship between the 
regime and the insurgent movement is one of asymmetry with regard to most aspects. 
Thus, this contest is not fair – many of the rules, for example, favor the insurgents; 
“[i]nsurgents succeed by sowing chaos and disorder anywhere, the government fails 
unless it maintains a degree of order everywhere.”101 This is particular true in the initial 
stages of insurgency. “Ironically, as the insurgents achieve more success and begin to 
control larger portions of the populace, many of these asymmetries diminish.”102 
Moreover, because there is very often several insurgent groups (especially in the incipient 
phase), as well as outside sponsors, the situation very often becomes ambiguous. Many 
analysts of insurgency, like Galula and O’Neill have emphasized the importance of the 
environment, which plays an even greater role in insurgent conflicts than in conventional 
conflicts. Because of their relative weakness, the insurgents usually have to use the 
environment to their advantage, which further complicates the counterinsurgents’ task. 
Given that political mobilization of the populace is paramount for both the insurgent and 
the regime, psychological programs (information operations) play a dominant role in this 
contest. As a corollary to these characteristics, the regime usually faces a long and 
difficult struggle when facing an insurgent movement challenging its legitimacy to rule. 
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In its simplest form, an insurgency is comprised of three parties: the regime, the 
insurgents and the population. However, very often a fourth party is involved; outside 
actors like supporting countries or organizations which may support either the regime or 
the insurgents. Sometimes this is even further complicated as there might be several 
insurgent movements fighting the regime or several outside actors which might support 
one or both sides. The crux, however, is that the regime and the insurgents both compete 
for the population’s support.  
The insurgents, depending on the conflict’s and the insurgent movement’s 
idiosyncrasies, can be broken into several groups. Broadly, insurgents can be divided into 
four major groups: leaders, fighters, facilitators, and supporters.103 Movement leaders 
provide strategic direction to the insurgency. Fighters do the actual fighting and provide 
security. The facilitators are active sympathizers who accomplish a myriad of supporting 
tasks. Supporters are the followers of the insurgent movement. Supporters may continue 
their normal positions in society or go underground. A fifth category, the political cadre, 
has often been an integral part of Communist insurgencies. The political cadre forms the 
political core of the insurgency, and implements guidance and procedures provided by 
the movement leaders. Although this term is seldom used by modern non-communist 
movements, insurgent movements based on religious extremism usually include religious 
or spiritual advisors among their cadre.104 It is important to note that a successful 
insurgency requires only the active support of a small part of the population and 
acquiescence from the rest. Some successful insurgencies, “…including the Chinese, 
Algerian, Vietnamese, and American struggle for independence, never had active 
majority support.”105   
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IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 
A. THE GENERAL NATURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY 
As the preceding chapter illustrates, insurgent conflict is characterized by an 
organized movement aiming at overthrowing a constituted government through the use of 
subversion and armed conflict. The central issue is political power, and, consequently, 
each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. 
Insurgents on their part, use all available tools – political, informational, military, and 
economic – to overthrow the existing authority. Clearly, many factors have bearing on 
the progress and outcome of insurgencies. None, however, is more important than the 
government’s response.106 This chapter therefore seeks to investigate and describe how a 
polity challenged by an insurgency can best defend itself against and ultimately defeat the 
challenging forces. I will therefore start with some general comments about the nature of 
counterinsurgency before describing some principles for effective counterinsurgency. I 
will end this chapter describing a simple model for counterinsurgency. 
As a corollary to the above mentioned, Western counterinsurgency doctrine, as 
the British Brigadier Sir Nigel Aylwin-Foster notes:  
…generally identifies the ‘hearts and minds campaign’ – gaining and 
maintaining the support of the domestic population in order to isolate the 
insurgent – as key to success. It thus sees the population as a political 
instrument of advantage. It further recognizes that military operations 
must contribute to the achievement of this effect and be subordinate to the 
political campaign. This implies that above all a COIN 
[counterinsurgency] force must have two skills that are not required in 
conventional warfighting: first, it must be able to see issues and actions 
from the perspective of the domestic population; second, it must 
understand the relative value of force and how easily excessive force, even 
when apparently justified, can undermine popular support. 107 
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History, however, has demonstrated that two important aspects underscored by Sir 
Aylwin-Foster are often ignored; the need for popular support and the inadequacy of 
conventional war fighting. The American experience in Vietnam and the Peruvian 
campaign against the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) movement, being just two sad 
examples.  
It is often said that insurgents start with nothing but a cause and grow to strength, 
while the regime starts with everything but a cause and gradually decline in strength to 
the point of weakness.108 This refers to the asymmetry between the regime and insurgents 
at the outset of the conflict as described in the previous chapter. The insurgent has few 
resources but operates clandestinely, has an information advantage (he knows who and 
where the enemy is), and he has the strategic initiative (he alone can initiate the conflict), 
while the counterinsurgent has superiority in tangible assets but has an information 
disadvantage (does not know who and where the enemy is). Moreover, in the field of 
intangibles, the insurgent has a formidable asset – the ideological power of a cause on 
which to base his action, while the counterinsurgent has a heavy liability – he is 
responsible for maintaining law and order.109 Bard O’Neill notes that: “[w]hether 
governments lose, maintain, or enhance their initial advantage depends, in the main, on 
how they mobilize and use the political and military resources at their disposal…”110 The 
outcome of a counterinsurgency campaign therefore results heavily upon the action taken 
by the counterinsurgents. 
In conventional war, military action remains the principal instrument. In insurgent 
warfare, as Galula notes, the picture is quite different.  The objective being the population 
itself, the operations are essentially political in nature. “It is not enough for the 
government to set political goals, to determine how much military force is applicable, to 
enter into alliances or break them; politics becomes an active instrument of operation.”111  
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Galula further notes that the interplay between the political and the military actions are so 
intricate that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary, every military move has to 
be weighed with regards to its political effects, and vice versa. This is supported by the 
scholars Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel who analyzed 43 post-World War Two 
insurgencies in which the United States or another Western country was involved. They 
found that “[v]irtually none of the insurgencies the world have experienced since the end 
of World War II appear to have been merely tools of policy – they were policy.”112 It is 
therefore fair to say, as Steven Metz does, that: “[c]ounterinsurgency is not an 
exclusively or even predominantly military function but demands the seamless 
integration of informational, political, social, cultural, law enforcement, economic, 
military, and intelligence activities.”113 Accordingly, the aforementioned leads to the 
conclusion that a sound counterinsurgency response is one that encompasses a wide range 
of civil and military programs, but where the latter is subjugated to and supporting the 
civilian effort. The Communist insurrection in Malaya, known as the Malayan 
Emergency, affords a good example of this. During the Emergency, which lasted from 
1948 to 1960, the British contained and ultimately defeated the Communist insurgents by 
employing a wide range of civil and military programs tied together by unified 
management. This government response was not primarily military; instead the 
U.K./Government of Malaya employed a mixed strategy encompassing civil, police, 
military, and psychological warfare programs, all within the rule of law.114 This response 
was so effective and successful that many analysts consider the Malayan Emergency a 
textbook example for how to quell an insurgency and thus a model to replicate.   
                                                 
112 Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, “Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a new 
Analytical Approach,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 3, Issue 3, Winter 1992, 273. 
113 Steven Metz, ”Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly (Winter 
2003-04): 33. 
114 Robert W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful 
Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1972), v. 
 40
Counterinsurgency is almost always by nature protracted.115 Some analysts have 
calculated that the average insurgency lasts about 13 years.116 Several factors result in 
this protractedness. First, counterinsurgency is protracted because it takes time for the 
insurgent leaders to organize an insurgent movement, to raise and develop armed forces 
and to reach a balance with the government forces, and to overpower them.117 Second, 
and more importantly, due to the initial weakness of the insurgents, they always operate 
clandestinely; at least until they have gained strength and thus can operate more openly. 
Very often, the only thing preventing the counterinsurgents from capturing or killing the 
insurgents is that they cannot find them. Building up reliable intelligence system takes 
time. Third, if the insurgents’ claims strike a chord in the population because the 
government is considered inept, unjust, corrupt, or otherwise less legitimate, then 
rectifying this lack of legitimacy is not done overnight. Thus, it can be argued that a 
counterinsurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, in order to attain 
specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the defeat of the insurgent organization 
and establishment of effective governance by a legitimate government. It may also be 
wise to bear in mind an admonition from Roger Trinquier, himself an experienced 
counterinsurgent and analyst who noted that: “Except for the rare exception, it 
[counterinsurgency] will never achieve spectacular results, so dear to laurel-seeking 
military leaders. It is only by means of a sum of perfectly coordinated complex measures 
that the struggle will, slowly but surely push the guerrilla to the wall.”118 Based on the 
aforementioned, it is therefore fair to say that counterinsurgency operations always  
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demand considerable expenditures of time and resources. Moreover, in order to be 
successful, a sound counterinsurgency campaign is one that is based on a long term 
commitment.  
Counterinsurgency is also almost always an ambiguous enterprise. As noted in the 
previous chapter, very often it is difficult to establish the insurgents’ real goal(s) and the 
strategy(ies) they pursue. Moreover, there may be more than one insurgent movement, 
and in some cases some of these movements may even fight each other. This may even 
be the case where there is outside support. Not only may this support be difficult to 
determine, but in cases where there are several outside supporters, some of them may 
even be inimical against each other. It is also not uncommon that insurgent movements 
are affiliated with organized crime or resort to criminal activity themselves, either for 
funding or as part of their offensive operations.119 Further compounding the matter for 
the counterinsurgents is that the insurgents, as noted in the previous paragraph, operates 
clandestinely. This implies that they very often blend into the local population, and 
therefore are very difficult to distinguish from the general population. It is therefore 
probably true to say, as Trinquier does, that: “If we want to meet the guerrilla 
successfully and to defeat him within a reasonable period of time, we must study his 
methods, study our own methods and their potential, and draw from this study some 
general principles that will detect the guerrilla’s weak points and concentrate our efforts 
on them.”120 I will therefore now discuss some of the principles that have been derived 
from previous studies of insurgent conflicts. 
B. PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY 
There have been many attempts at deriving principles for effective 
counterinsurgency. Arguably, the scholar Kalev I. Sepp’s121 examination of 20th-century 
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insurgencies is one of the more comprehensive and useful studies. Hence, I will use this 
study as a backdrop for this section.122 Sepp analyzed a total of 53 20th-century 
insurgencies in order to establish which counterinsurgency practices were successful and 
which failed. 
Sepp suggests that the center of gravity in any insurgent conflict is the country’s 
people and their belief in and support of their government.123 Winning their hearts and 
minds must therefore be the objective of the government, and because this is a policy 
objective, it must be directed by the country’s political leaders. Others, like Roger 
Trinquier supports this by noting that: “…the allegiance of the civilian population 
becomes the most vital objectives of the whole struggle.”124 Moreover, Trinquier notes 
that: “[insurgent warfare] requires the unconditional support of the populace. This 
support must be maintained at any price.”125 126 
Human rights must be assured for the government to win the population’s 
allegiance. Peoples’ security must be assured as a basic need, along with sustenance, 
shelter, health services, and a means of earning a living. Moreover, freedom of religion, 
access to education, and equal rights for women must be met. Sepp also notes that the 
failure of counterinsurgencies and the root cause of the insurgencies themselves can often 
be traced to governments’ disregard for these basic rights. Moreover, “[r]ecognition and 
assurance of these rights by the government has been essential to turning a population 
away from insurgents and their promises.”127 This is also supported by Trinquier, who 
from experience underscores the importance of treating the population who constitute the 
battleground in insurgent warfare with consideration and respect.128 What both of these 
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analysts have in mind is legitimacy. By assuring human rights and treating the population 
with consideration and respect, the government’s legitimacy is enhanced while the 
insurgents’ legitimacy is likely to decrease. 
Given that insurgent warfare by nature leads to disorder, the imperative of 
maintaining peoples’ security and proper law enforcement are of paramount importance. 
Sepp therefore asserts that intelligence operations that identify insurgents for arrest and 
prosecution are the single most important practice to maintain peoples’ security.129 
Central to this intelligence collection is honest, trained and robust police forces who can 
gain intelligence at the community level in which they have intimate knowledge. 
Supporting the police must be an incorrupt and well functioning judiciary which can 
prosecute and eventually sentence the captured insurgents. Military and paramilitary 
forces can also support the police in their performance of their law enforcement duties. In 
this regard, it must be noted that traditionally there has been an argument whether the 
military forces should be subjugated to the police forces or vice versa. The former was 
the case in the Malayan Emergency, where all military effort was subjugated to and 
supporting the civil effort. This is also supported by analysts like Frank Kitson, Steven 
Metz, Bard E. O’Neill and David Galula, to mention a few. The latter, for example, notes 
that “…the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to 
afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.” He then 
adds that “[a] revolutionary war is 20 per cent military action and 80 per cent 
political.”130   
Since insurgents almost invariably rely on members of the population for 
concealment, supplies, and recruits, isolating the insurgents from the population is an 
important counterinsurgency measure.131 Population control is therefore imperative, and 
among the most effective measures are vehicle and personnel checkpoints and national 
identity cards. Again, the Malayan Emergency affords a good example of the 
effectiveness of this measure. In the Emergency’s first years, the Communist insurgents 
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had considerable support among parts of the population (the Chinese squatters in 
particular), and thus were able to operate with relative ease in many of the populated 
areas. However, when the government’s counterinsurgent strategy was changed in 1950, 
population control was emphasized, which again resulted in the insurgents being forced 
into the jungle, effectively breaking the links between the insurgent organization and its 
support base. It is also worth mentioning that although such control measures entail 
impediments for the population, it also has the effect that they serve as a justification for 
a lack of support from people being pressured into supporting insurgents.  
Given that insurgency and counterinsurgency are a contest for the right to rule, 
and, moreover, that civil response takes primacy over military response, political process 
is of considerable importance. History reminds us that the counterinsurgent often has to 
accede to political reforms in order to deprive the insurgent of some of his appeal. During 
the Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines, for example, the government successfully 
implemented land reforms as a means to deprive the insurgents of their appeal. Sepp also 
notes the importance of informational campaigns in support of political process, for 
example as a mean to encourage voting in local and national elections.132  
Counterinsurgent warfare may, of course, also entail the use of military force. 
Allied military forces and advisory teams, Sepp notes, can support police forces and fight 
insurgents, and thus bolster security until indigenous security forces are competent to 
perform these tasks without allied assistance.133 Moreover, constant patrolling by 
government forces establishes an official presence that enhances security and builds 
confidence in the government. Very often, the police force is not large enough to 
maintain effective patrolling and the military forces may then be a good substitute. 
In cases where the insurgents receive outside support, this support must be 
effectively stopped. Border crossings must be restricted to deny insurgents access to 
sanctuaries and supplies, and to enhance national sovereignty.134 Although the French 
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built a 320-kilometer-long barrier on the eastern Algeria border which effectively stopped 
insurgent infiltration, effectively securing the borders is usually an extremely difficult 
task. The problem of securing Afghanistan’s borders affords a good example of this 
challenge.  
Finally, Sepp, as many analysts before him, notes the importance of executive 
authority. “Emergency conditions dictate that a government needs a single, fully 
empowered executive to direct and coordinate counterinsurgency efforts.”135 Power 
sharing, while appreciated in peace time, may present wartime vulnerabilities and gaps in 
coordination that insurgents can exploit. However, experience has showed that having a 
single “supremo” directing all counterinsurgency efforts may be hard to achieve. Unity of 
effort should then be emphasized in the absence of unity of command. Thus one enhances 
the probability of proper coordination of all counterinsurgency measures. 
As examples of failed counterinsurgency practices, Sepp points to the American 
intervention in Vietnam and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In the critical initial 
phase of these wars, military staffs rather than civil governments guided operations, 
which were characterized by large-unit sweeps that cleared but then abandoned 
communities and terrain.136 Emphasis was on killing and capturing enemy personnel 
rather then engaging the population. Massive artillery and aerial bombardment were 
employed in both conflicts with the intent of defeating the enemy forces by attriting them 
to the point of collapse, an objective which was never reached. Moreover, indigenous 
armies, although fighting in their own country and more numerous than the foreign 
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The findings in Kalev Sepp’s study of 20th-century insurgencies are summarized 
in the following table. 
Table 4.1. Successful and Unsuccessful Counterinsurgency Practices137 
Successful Unsuccessful 
 Emphasis on intelligence 
 Focus on the population, their 
needs, and   security  
 Secure areas established, expanded 
 Insurgents isolated from population 
(population control) 
 Single authority 
(charismatic/dynamic leader) 
 Effective, pervasive psychological 
operations (PSYOPS) campaigns 
 Amnesty and rehabilitation for 
insurgents 
 Police in lead; military supporting 
 Police force expanded, diversified 
 Conventional military forces 
reoriented for counterinsurgency 
 Special Forces, advisers embedded 
with indigenous forces 
 Insurgent sanctuaries denied 
 Primacy of military direction of 
counterinsurgency 
 Priority to “kill – capture” enemy, 
not engaging population 
 Battalion-size operations as the 
norm 
 Military units concentrated on large 
bases for protection 
 Special forces focused on raiding 
 Adviser effort a low priority in 
personnel assignment 
 Building, training indigenous army 
in image of U.S. Army 
 Peacetime government processes 
 Open borders, airspace, coastlines 
 
Not surprisingly, Sepp’s findings were to a large extent corroborated by the 
aforementioned study of 43 different insurgencies by Max Manwaring and John Fishel. 
Their first finding was that military force should not be applied ad hoc in response to 
either political or military failure, or in an attempt to “try something that might work.”138 
Moreover, they argue that if military force must be inserted into a nationalistic milieu, it 
should be done overwhelmingly from the outset. They also found that probably the best 
possible use of “foreign” military personnel in a Third World conflict is one variation or 
another of “train the trainer” role. Their second finding was that to be effective, all 
support to an incumbent government had to be consistent.139 Third, their findings 
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indicated that the legitimacy dimension is probably the most important internal 
dimension of a war against subversion. “Thus, a politically strong and legitimate 
incumbent government is vital to any winning strategy for counterinsurgencies. The 
legitimacy of the incumbent regime is the primary target – the centre of gravity – as far as 
the insurgent organization is concerned”.140 However, although legitimacy is the most 
important internal dimension, it is not the single strongest dimension. Rather support to 
the Host Country government is.141 What this implies is that the interaction between the 
Intervening Power and the Host Government, especially with respect to legitimacy, is 
critical to counterinsurgency success. Hence they note that “[f]ailure of the Intervening 
Power to reinforce the Host Government’s efforts to attain or enhance its legitimacy 
probably dooms the counterinsurgency to failure.”142 Their fourth finding was that a 
major goal of any counterinsurgency effort must be to separate insurgents from 
sanctuaries and other sources of support.143 This principle was clearly demonstrated in all 
the cases examined. Other principles they found to be important included, fifth, “…the 
concept that intelligence and psychological operations, and population controls must be 
designed to quickly locate, isolate, and destroy the insurgency.”144 Another principle that 
their data suggests to be of importance is the need for the incumbent government to foster 
a well-disciplined, highly professional, motivated security force capable of rapid and 
decisive actions designed to achieve political as well as military objectives.145  
Finally, the last principle they derived from the data concerns the necessary 
political/psychological organization that must be established at the highest levels to 
organize, create, set, and effectively pursue the necessary political objective of the 
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 struggle.146  This principle, they notes, implies that the principle of unity of command is 
followed. Moreover, this principle insures that all efforts are focused on the ultimate 
common goal which is survival.  
Although several noted analysts, based on extensive case studies, have derived 
principles for effective counterinsurgency, it is imperative to bear in mind that as a 
corollary to every insurgency having its specific characteristics, the government’s 
response has to be tailored to that specific conflict. Hence, these principles’ real value is 
to serve as a guide to be considered when the counterinsurgent devises and implements 
his response. 
C. A SIMPLE MODEL FOR EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Many models for understanding insurgency and counterinsurgency have been 
developed. Arguably, one of the more useful ones is the “Mystic Diamond Model” 
developed by the scholar Gordon H. McCormick.147 This model is depicted in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1. The “Mystic Diamond Model” 
 
This figure illustrates the principal actors in an insurgency, as described in 
Chapter III. The primary actors are: the government, the population, and the counter 
government (insurgent organization(s)). Moreover, very often international actors are 
involved, supporting either side. This model has five legs. As the preceding discussion 
has demonstrated, in order for a government to successfully counter an insurgency, it 
must build its legitimacy and control with the population (Leg 1). The government can 
then turn to lower the insurgent movement’s legitimacy and control with the population 
(Leg 2). It is imperative to note that by building legitimacy and control with the 
population, the government will acquire the actionable intelligence needed to be effective 
in capturing or killing members of the insurgent infrastructure. The government can thus 
turn to applying coercive force against the insurgent infrastructure (Leg 3). It is important 
to note that in order to be most effective; these strategies should be executed in this 
sequence. Remember, that in the initial stages of the insurgency there is an asymmetric 
relationship between the counterinsurgents and the insurgents with regard to information. 
The former does not know who or where the insurgents are, while the latter knows who 
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and where the counterinsurgents are. Conventional military forces typically make the 
mistake of immediately attacking the insurgent infrastructure through kinetic operations 
before controlling the population (Leg 1) or having broken the insurgents’ links to the 
population (Leg 2). The result is poor intelligence, excessive collateral damage and 
exhaustion of resources.148 While attacking legs 1, 2 and 3, the government must 
determine if the insurgents have external support. If so, the government must build its 
legitimacy in the eyes of relevant international actors like: other governments, 
international governmental organizations, non governmental organizations, etc. This is 
represented by leg 4. Building external legitimacy will thus increase the government’s 
external support from the international community.149 Finally, the government must also 
break the links between the outside actor(s) and the insurgents (Leg 5). Although these 
steps should be implemented sequentially in order to be most efficient; if a “golden 
opportunity” arises, then such a chance should not be ignored. If, for example, insurgent 
leaders are identified during step 1, direct action against them could be implemented 
although normally not used on a large scale until step 3.150 One should also have in mind 
that the insurgents, if they are wise, pursue the same steps. Finally, it should be 
mentioned that if a counterinsurgency is to succeed, it must address all five legs of the 
diamond.151 
It can now be instructive to see how this model compares with the findings 
discussed in the previous section. 
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Figure 4.2. The “Mystic Diamond” compared with “Best Practices” 
 
As Figure 4-2 illustrates, the “Mystic Diamond Model” is in accordance with the 
“best practices” identified in earlier counterinsurgency case studies. It is now time to put 
this to good use and investigate what this implies for NORSOF.   
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR NORSOF 
A. HOW DOES NORSOF’S UNDERSTANDING OF 
COUNTERINSURGENCY MATCH WITH HISTORIC BEST 
PRACTICES? 
From official sources, very little information is available on NORSOF’s 
contemporary operations or the forces involved.152 Moreover, details about NORSOF’s 
capabilities are classified.153 Thus, due to these constraints, the level of detail of this 
chapter will necessarily be somewhat limited. However, what can be said is that the 
Norwegian Joint Doctrine defines NORSOF’s missions to the following five categories: 
Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, Military Assistance, Special Air Operations and 
Counterterrorism Operations.154 Special Reconnaissance encompasses collection of 
information that is of operational or strategic importance.155 Direct Action encompasses 
actions like raids, sabotage as well as hostage rescue operations.156 Military Assistance 
involves several activities like training, equipping and the possible direction of resistance 
movements or guerrilla forces. Moreover, it encompasses contributions to stability 
operations; including capabilities that will enhance own forces’ force protection and 
liaison, or activities that can otherwise enhance the communication between the 
parties.157 Special Air Operations are operations with air units that are equipped, 
organized, and trained for operating independent of or together with special operations 
forces/conventional forces.158 Counter Terrorism Operations are measures aimed at 
reducing the vulnerability of national or allied interests, their forces, personnel and 
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property when attacked by terrorists.159 NATO, however, defines special operations 
missions slightly different. According to NATO doctrine, SOF missions are divided into 
two categories, principal tasks and other activities.160 The former category includes 
Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action and Military Assistance. The latter category 
includes missions like Support to Counter-terrorism and Counterinsurgency; Countering 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons; and Hostage Release 
Operations.  
When discussing NORSOF’s missions and roles in counterinsurgency, I also find 
it instructive to draw on an article by the scholars David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, 
in which they discuss a need for restructuring the U.S. Special Operations Forces.161  
According to Tucker and Lamb, there are primarily two principal modes in which special 
operations accomplish their tasks: the direct action approach and the indirect approach. 
The direct approach, according to Tucker and Lamb, brings force directly into contact 
with the enemy, and examples include destroying a key installation (direct action), 
reconnoitering the installation before the attack (special reconnaissance), and deceiving 
the enemy so an attack can be carried out (a subset of information operations).162 The 
other mode, the indirect approach, works indirectly by, with, and through other military 
forces or civilians to achieve the desired results.163,164 Using this framework, it seems 
clear that of the five principal missions defined by the Norwegian Joint Doctrine, only 
military assistance clearly falls within the indirect approach, which experience has 
demonstrated is of such crucial importance for successful counterinsurgency.165  
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Although little has been released on NORSOF’s participation in international 
operations, it is probably fair to assume that NORSOF has been utilized within its 
traditional domain, which is within the spectrum of direct action capabilities.166 The 
primary reason for this assumption is that NORSOF, according to Tom Robertsen, 
traditionally has focused on direct action rather than indirect action capabilities.  Both 
MJK and FSK/HJK, which constitute the majority of NORSOF, were founded during the 
Cold War when defense of Norwegian territory was the primary role for the NAF and 
hence for NORSOF. In a war on national territory, indirect capabilities are less applicable 
than direct action capabilities, and thus the primary focus was on the latter. Implicit in 
this argument, however, is that this change from primarily direct action capabilities to 
also possessing indirect capabilities either is a result of a deliberate choice or that 
NORSOF has been less successful in making this transition. The former can be as a result 
of a perceived need for NORSOF to mainly focus on missions typically undertaken by, 
for example, American special mission units and certain other units like the British SBS 
and SAS or the French GIGN, to mention a few. As for the latter view, that NORSOF has 
not been able to change focus according to the changing security environment, if this 
holds true, this may be understandable as many countries have experienced the same 
problem.167 However, whatever the reason for this lack of NORSOF’s indirect 
capabilities, the point being made here is that for NORSOF to be a flexible and relevant 
force that can also effectively bring force to bear in operations at the lower end of the 
conflict spectrum, and thus be an effective instrument of Norwegian foreign and security 
policy, NORSOF also needs to possess indirect capabilities. To put my argument 
succinctly, NORSOF needs to be able to carry out operations utilizing both direct action 
capabilities as well as indirect action capabilities. 
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Increasing the emphasis on indirect capabilities, however, will require increased 
emphasis on the social, political, and cultural aspects of a conflict. This again must be 
embedded in the chosen strategy.168 In the following section, some of the implications 
this entails for NORSOF will be discussed. However, it is important to note that applying 
and utilizing indirect force capabilities effectively require prior training and mental 
preparation. This is not acquired overnight, although this is a common misperception.169  
B. WHAT CHANGES CAN BE MADE THAT WILL ENHANCE NORSOF’S 
EFFICACY IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS?  
Arguably, there are many changes that can be made that will enhance NORSOF’s 
efficacy in counterinsurgency operations. It is, however, not feasible to discuss all of 
them in this study, and, hence, only those changes that this author find most salient will 
be discussed in the following sections.  
It is commonly known and accepted that good intelligence is the foundation for 
any successful military operation and for special operations in particular. What is less 
known, however, is that counterinsurgency operations are even more reliant upon timely 
and accurate intelligence than most other types of military operations. Remember, that 
usually the only thing that keeps the counterinsurgents from crushing the insurgents (at 
least in the incipient phase), is that they do not know who or where the insurgents are. 
Accurate and timely intelligence therefore becomes paramount for successful 
counterinsurgency. The British General Frank Kitson, himself a seasoned 
counterinsurgent with experience from insurgency campaigns in Kenya, Malaya, Oman, 
Cyprus, and Northern Ireland, noted for example that: “The problem of destroying enemy 
armed groups and their supporters therefore consists very largely on finding them. Once 
found they can no longer strike on their own terms but are obliged to dance to the tune of 
the government’s forces.”170 In the foreword to Kitson’s book, General Sir Michael 
Carver noted that: “The necessity for the intimate integration of intelligence and 
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operations is his most important lesson and the one least appreciated by the conventional 
soldier.” Although this was written almost 40 years ago, experience has demonstrated 
that very often this holds true even today. It is also imperative to note that 
counterinsurgency operations also call for a slightly different kind of intelligence, as a 
result of the importance of the population. These two factors are often overlooked by the 
novice counterinsurgent.  
The Norwegian Joint Doctrine, for example, affords a good example of the 
“traditional” view of the kind of intelligence that Special Operations Forces need when it 
advises that: “Special operations demands comprehensive information about the 
adversary, geography and weather conditions,”171 thus effectively leaving out the most 
important factor in a counterinsurgency, the population. Arguably, Roger Trinquier 
captured the essence of this problem more than 40 years ago when he noted that: 
“Military schools teaching classic doctrines of warfare rely upon a number of decision 
factors – the mission, the enemy, the terrain, and the resources. But one factor that is 
essential to the conduct of [insurgent warfare] is omitted – the inhabitant.”172 If the 
Norwegian Joint Doctrine gives a reasonably accurate picture of NORSOF’s intelligence 
focus, and this author believes it does, then NORSOF needs to also include the 
population as a factor that needs to be more emphasized when for example developing 
intelligence products like “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,” and, moreover, as 
a general source of information. Likewise, the population’s importance with regard 
intelligence requirements needs to be revised accordingly.  
Concerning the importance and role of intelligence in counterinsurgency, the new 
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Counterinsurgency (COIN) is an intelligence-driven endeavor. The 
function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate understanding of the 
operational environment, with emphasis on the populace, host nation, and 
insurgents. Commanders require accurate intelligence about these three 
areas to best address the issues driving the insurgency. Both insurgents 
and counterinsurgents require an effective intelligence capability to be 
successful. Both attempt to create and maintain intelligence networks 
while trying to neutralize their opponent’s intelligence capabilities.173 
As the preceding discussion implies, NORSOF’s operations must be driven by 
intelligence.174 Having said that, it is also important to note that intelligence and 
operations feed each other. Effective intelligence drives effective operations; effective 
operations produce information, which generate more intelligence. Likewise, ineffective 
or inaccurate intelligence produces ineffective operations, which produce the opposite 
results.175 It also implies that intelligence in counterinsurgency is about people. NORSOF 
must therefore understand the people of the host nation, the insurgents, and the host 
nation government. Experience has also demonstrated that every counterinsurgent 
collects information whenever he or she is in contact with the population. It is also worth 
mentioning that insurgencies are local; they vary greatly in time and space. This implies 
that the insurgency one unit faces will often be different from that faced by an adjacent 
unit. The mosaic nature of insurgencies, coupled with the fact that every soldier is a 
potential intelligence collector, means that all echelons both produce and consume 
intelligence. This situation results in a bottom-flow of intelligence.176 It is also worth 
mentioning that Kitson advises that there are generally two types of information 
collection processes. “The first one consists of collecting background information, and 
the second involves developing it into contact information.”177 As a corollary to the 
abovementioned, although fairly obvious, NORSOF must constantly seek to collect 
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information that can produce intelligence.178 This information must be both background 
information and contact information; and for use in NORSOF’s own operations and for 
other forces’ operations. 
As previously mentioned, successful counterinsurgency normally implies that in 
general an indirect approach and non-kinetic operations are more effective and efficient 
than a direct approach that emphasizes kinetic operations, and moreover, that 
counterinsurgency requires a special type of intelligence. Arguably, a promising concept 
in this regard, is what Joel W. Thomas has labeled “indirect intelligence.”179 Indirect 
intelligence as defined by Thomas is “ …information gathered on a specific community 
that provides operators and planners detailed information on the individuals, networks, 
emotions, motives and objective reasoning of that community as opposed to “direct” 
intelligence which is solely focused on gathering information on the adversary.”180 The 
purpose of indirect intelligence, according to Thomas, is to seek out detailed information 
on the target audience (population) that can be used to: 1) influence the emotions, 
motives, and behavior of the target audience; 2) identify key individuals and social 
networks; and 3) expose the enemy through reverse network mapping. Thus, the rationale 
behind the indirect intelligence follows the same logic as the indirect approach of the 
Mystic Diamond Model: by using the information provided by indirect intelligence to 
influence the population, information on the enemy will become readily available and 
easily attainable.181 There are two main reasons, according to Thomas, for indirect 
intelligence being more appropriate than “direct intelligence” (which focuses strictly on 
the insurgents). First, in an insurgent environment, as suggested by Kitson, the 
adversary’s inherent mode of operation provides very little information that can be 
collected or acted upon. Frank Kitson, for example, asserts that: “…the sort of 
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information required cannot, except on rare occasions, be provided on a plate by anyone, 
not even by the intelligence organization. If there was a system whereby the intelligence 
organization could do this, it would have been devised years ago…”182 Second, the type 
of information that indirect intelligence seeks out, information on the target audience, is 
readily available and easily collected (given that you have access to the community). This 
information can be gathered through social interaction with the target audience and by 
conducting un-intrusive censuses amongst the community. 
As a corollary to the ultimate objective of indirect intelligence being to expose the 
adversary so that they can be captured or killed, Thomas suggests there are three 
supporting objectives that serve to focus the type of information needed and the 
collection methods that indirect intelligence needs. The first supporting objective is to 
gain information that will allow you to influence the emotions, motives, and behavior of 
the target audience.183 This is important as this amounts to a type of control that will have 
little flash back and yet have long lasting effects in comparison to a purely kinetic means 
of control. In order to do this, Thomas notes, a message must address the needs, motives, 
and objective reasoning of the population. This again, requires in-dept information that 
can only be provided through social interaction amongst the population and information 
produced from the indirect intelligence census approach. Although these methods provide 
an even more indirect route to the adversary, they will create a longer lasting impression 
on the population about the intentions and perceptions of the forces involved, as well as 
provide information that the operators can continually use to build rapport through the 
community.184 
The second objective, according to Thomas, is to identify key personnel and 
networks that can be utilized to propagate the message throughout the community.185 Key 
personnel as defined by Thomas, is 1) people who have enough influence within a 
community that can mobilize others to action; 2) people who are well connected 
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throughout the community; 3) people who others tend to seek out for information and 
knowledge on a wide spectrum of topics.186 Identification of social networks are 
important as they possess an organization and infrastructure (communication lines) that 
will allow for the dissemination of a given influence message, and, moreover, as social 
networks inherently possess a status influence equivalent to peer pressure, where once an 
idea is accepted by key personnel in the group, others will be reluctant to oppose it. 
Thomas’ point with this objective is that identifying key personnel and social networks 
will provide a clear picture of who belongs in the community and who does not, resulting 
in a reverse network map of the enemy and its active supporters. 
This takes us to the third objective which is reverse network mapping of the 
enemy and its active supporters. This is an indirect approach to mapping an insurgent 
group and its base of support within a local community. “By utilizing techniques, 
technologies and methods used to map a terrorist or insurgent network on the population 
of a specific community,” Thomas notes, “in theory the insurgents and their networks 
will be revealed.”187 This network mapping, of course, is enhanced by the use of various 
software developed for social network mapping. Reverse networking, according to 
Thomas,  
…is similar to putting a puzzle together under the following conditions: 1) 
given a box filled with pieces to a puzzle along with a few similar pieces 
that don’t belong to this particular puzzle, 2) the task is to identify the 
pieces that don’t belong in the box. There may be several strategies to 
accomplish this task but the surest way to find the pieces that don’t 
belong, is to put the puzzle together and see what pieces are left rather 
than searching through the entire box for individual pieces about which 
you have little information.188 
The indirect intelligence concept’s merits, as suggested by Thomas, are that by 
knowing both the population and all the relationships within that community, one starts to 
reduce the information advantage that the insurgents have over the counterinsurgents. 
Moreover, by virtue of knowing occupations, status, and positions within the community 
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the counterinsurgent will be aware of who is best suited to support the insurgents or, 
conversely, know who the enemy is most likely to target for support.  
It is also imperative to note that NORSOF, because of the complexity inherent in 
any counterinsurgency, must have access to “all source intelligence.” Moreover, 
NORSOF itself must possess as many all source intelligence collection capabilities as 
possible. Especially important in this regard, as pointed out by Aylwin-Foster, is the 
importance of human intelligence (HUMINT).189 The U.S. forces in Iraq, according to 
Aylwin-Foster, initially put relatively little emphasis on HUMINT:  
…concentrating instead on using technological assets to gather 
intelligence, the significance being that the latter can serve to keep the 
troops separated from the local population. This assists force protection, in 
the short term, particularly in an environment where suicide bombers are 
the major threat, but it equally helps encourage the local sentiment that the 
troops are a distant, impersonal occupying force which has no interest in 
the population. It denies one avenue for nurturing popular support.190  
To put my argument succinctly, NORSOF in addition to focus on direct 
intelligence must also emphasize indirect intelligence. This is based on the fact that the 
inhabitants will know the insurgents since they suffer terribly from their activities.191 By 
first focusing on the population, leads that will eventually lead to the insurgents and their 
support base will be exposed. Consequently, NORSOF will have actionable intelligence 
which either NORSOF or other forces can put to good use. Thus, the possibility of 
collateral damage as a result of poor or faulty intelligence which again can result in 
alienating the population will decrease.    
This brings us to the next implication for NORSOF, the need for gaining popular 
support through strengthening the host nation’s security forces. As discussed in the 
preceding chapter, a prerequisite for successful counterinsurgency is that the government 
is perceived as legitimate by the population. An important foundation for this legitimacy 
is that the government institutions are able to provide security and other essential services 
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to the population. Thus, the need for the incumbent government to foster a well-
disciplined, highly professional, motivated security force capable of rapid and decisive 
actions designed to achieve political as well as military objectives is key to success. 
Moreover, by strengthening the host nation’s security forces, the regime will be better 
positioned to control the situation themselves, and thus be less dependent on outside 
support.    
In Norwegian and NATO doctrines, this effort is defined as Military Assistance 
(MA) and in U.S. doctrines it is defined as Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Although the 
Norwegian definition of MA implies that special operations can involve military 
assistance to allied or other countries in peace, crisis and armed conflict, it differs from 
NATO’s definition. The Norwegian definition focuses on equipping, training and 
possible direction of resistance and guerrilla forces; and establishing and supporting 
networks that hide personnel or help them escape.192 Support to stabilization operations is 
also included. NATO’s definition is more in line with the U.S. definition of FID.193 
NATO’s Allied Doctrine for Special Operations, AJP-3.5, defines MA as:  
…a broad spectrum of measures in support of friendly forces in peace, 
crisis, and conflict. MA can be conducted by, with, or through friendly 
forces that are trained, equipped, supported, or employed in varying 
degrees by SOF. The range of MA is thus considerable, and may vary 
from providing low-level military training or material assistance to the 
active employment of indigenous forces in the conduct of major 
operations….194 
AJP-3.5 further advises that MA may include the following: “Host Nation 
Military Assistance” and “Population Security.” The former is operations focused on 
training “…host nation military individuals and units…” while the latter is “…operations 
that strengthen population security by providing supervision of tactical operations by HN 
                                                 
192 Forsvarsstaben, 125. 
193 U.S. Doctrine defines FID as: “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in 
any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect from subversion, lawlessness 
and insurgency.” Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, 1-84. 
194 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, AJP-3,5, 2-2 – 2-3. 
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[host nation] military units to…”195 The aim of Host Nation Military Assistance is to 
enable “…a HN to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, and to 
develop individual, leader, and organizational skills.”196 The aim of Population Security 
is “…to neutralize and destroy insurgent threats, isolate insurgents from the civil 
population, and protect the civil population.”197   
Based on this, this author will argue that the Norwegian definition of MA is less 
adequate than NATO’s definition as it focuses more on “behind the lines” operations 
suitable for the Cold War era and less on strengthening host nation institutions and forces 
which recent experience has proved to be of such importance. Consequently, the 
Norwegian Joint Doctrine’s definition of MA should be superseded by NATO’s 
definition of MA.   
It is now germane to this discussion to turn to the question of what the 
abovementioned implies for NORSOF in terms of operational requirements. It should 
now be clear that strengthening a host nation’s institutions and security forces is both 
imperative for successful counterinsurgency, and, moreover, that MA can be a proper 
mission for NORSOF. A third reason why NORSOF should possess MA capabilities can 
be found in the fact that operational guidelines may require it, as for example the later 
stages of the Afghan insurgency reminds us about. As a corollary to the establishment of 
an elected Afghan government, following the toppling of the Taliban regime in 
December 2001, and the subsequent effort at building up viable Afghan institutions 
perceived as legitimate by the population, the Afghan government has in later years 
instructed that Afghan security forces have to accompany coalition forces on certain 
missions. This would for instance typically be missions where the coalition forces intend 
on searching Afghan homes, or missions that includes the intended use of force. 
Consequently, in order for NORSOF to be able to conduct all types of special operations 
missions, some circumstances may require that NORSOF has to work by, through and 
with host nation security forces.      
                                                 
195 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, AJP-3,5, 2-3. 
196 Ibid., 2-3. 
197 Ibid. 
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This being said, historically, MA and FID have been the subjects of much 
controversy. Many have raised questions whether they are a proper special operations 
missions or whether it is efficient use of special operations forces. Consequently, MA and 
FID have been emphasized differently by different countries. Detractors of MA could 
thus argue that training host nation conventional forces is not efficient use of NORSOF. 
Given that conventional forces trained in the conduct of MA are available, this argument 
has merit. However, conventional forces are not always available and thus special 
operations forces may be the only one capable of such a task. Moreover, in some cases 
MA involves training host nation special operations forces, and who is better suited for 
that task than another special operations force? It could also be argued that if there is an 
operational requirement for NORSOF to conduct MA, this can sometimes best be 
conducted by NORSOF’s combat support element,198 thus freeing NORSOF’s 
operational elements from training indigenous forces leaving them available for other 
missions or the employment of already trained indigenous forces. This, of course, 
requires that this combat support element is trained in MA. In short, NORSOF should be 
prepared to conduct MA if it is operationally required as its goal is to protect and increase 
the legitimacy of the host nation government. 
It seems reasonable to infer, that as a result of NORSOF having mainly focused 
on the insurgent forces, less attention has been paid to the indigenous government forces. 
This being said, the important question is not how much NORSOF has focused on MA 
earlier but what its current and future MA capabilities and willingness to undertake such 
missions are. As experience has demonstrated, and as pointed out by various analysts, 
MA capabilities are not acquired overnight.199 If NORSOF has not already developed 
these capabilities it should seek to acquire them immediately, and more importantly, seek 
to conduct MA when in a counterinsurgency environment if required.  
 
                                                 
198 This form of combat support refers to the use of for example the Norwegian Coastal Ranger Unit 
which is an operational unit that on several occasions has supported NORSOF.  
 199 Robertsen, 76. 
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When discussing MA, this author find it appropriate do distinguish between the 
MA as conducted by a unit or parts of a unit and MA conducted on a more individual 
basis. By the latter I mean providing advice on a more personal level. For the purpose of 
this study, I will call this “advising.” This type of MA (I consider it a subcategory of 
MA) has been utilized by several countries with great success. Instructive on this point is 
for example Edward Geary Lansdale, a U.S. Air Force colonel (later major general), who 
in 1950 was sent to the Philippines as an advisor following the outbreak of the 
Hukbalahap rebellion. Lansdale quickly became personal advisor to Raymond Magsasay, 
the Philippine Secretary of Defense (who in 1953 was elected president). Partly because 
of Lansdale’s operational experience as an Office of the Strategic Services (OSS) agent 
during the Second World War, and partly because of the strong rapport he was able to 
build with Secretary Magsaysay, Lansdale effectively advised Magsaysay when he 
devised and implemented his program of counterinsurgency based on land reform, grass 
root democracy, and elimination of corruption in the Philippine Army, which should 
prove so effective.200  
I will therefore argue that in the future, advising can also be a niche for NORSOF 
personnel because of the operational counterinsurgency experience this personnel has 
acquired. Upon request by a host nation, by assigning an individual or a small group of 
individuals as advisors, Norway can assist a country facing an insurgency. One possible 
solution can be to send a small team of advisors with cross-sector competence from for 
example the military, judicial, legislative and police sectors, to mention a few, that can 
provide advice on how to devise and implement sound counterinsurgency measures that 
meet the local needs. This, of course, would first of all require that the advisors know the 
subjects at hand, how to conduct counterinsurgency and how to advice, neither of which 
history has demonstrated are commonly held attributes. The point being made here, is 
that Norway by providing a small number of advisors that can advice at the proper level 
and within an area in which they have expertise, for example the military response, can 
help a government combating an insurgency with its own forces in an effective and 
                                                 
 200 O’Neill, 173. For an account, although very subjective, of Lansdale’s advisory missions to the 
Philippines and Vietnam, see: Edward Geary Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to 
Southeast Asia (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991). 
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efficient way. An added bonus of having this capability is that Norway can assist a 
foreign country without necessarily having to contribute a large contingent of Norwegian 
personnel. Moreover, by conducting MA and advising, NORSOF not only strengthens the 
host nation’s capability to physically deal with the insurgency, but is also likely to 
increase the population’s confidence in their own government, which is so crucial in 
counterinsurgency. This leads us to the third major implication for NORSOF, the need to 
understand the importance of influencing the population.    
As earlier noted, winning the hearts and minds of the population is usually the 
crux of sound counterinsurgency. Consequently, the government must act in a way that 
limits the insurgents influence over the population while enhancing its own influence. 
One effective means of influencing the population (and the insurgents) is psychological 
operations (PSYOP), which by nature seeks to persuade by nonviolent means. Thus, 
effective, pervasive PSYOP are identified as crucial in this effort and need to be 
exploited, as suggested by the earlier mentioned findings of Kalev Sepp and Max 
Manwaring & John Fishel. “Psychological warfare,” General Richard G. Stilwell 
explains, “seeks to achieve the objective where military force is unavailable or 
inappropriate, or where it can combine with the military to minimize expenditures while 
maximizing effects.”201  Instructive on this point, however, is also Frank Kitson’s 
observation that:  
All too often successful government action in the civil and military field is 
rendered completely useless because the machinery for exploiting success 
in the minds of the people is non-existent. At the same time the enemy 
who have suffered the reverse in fact, are able to nullify it, or even turn it 
to their advantage in the minds of the people, because they have the means 
of getting their version of events across.202  
It is also imperative to have in mind, as discussed in Chapter III that the 
insurgents usually rely heavily on portraying the incumbent regime as illegitimate and 
incapable of governing the people. Consequently, the insurgents often depend on creating 
                                                 
201 Richard G. Stilwell, “Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency,” in Frank L. 
Goldstein ed.: Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 
Air University Press, 1996), pp. 319-320. 
202 Kitson, 78. 
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narratives that frame the conflict according to their view, and, moreover, serve as a 
justification for their own actions.203 From this one can derive that to defeat the 
insurgents’ narratives the counterinsurgents must generate a strong counter narrative.204 It 
is therefore true to say, as Frank Kitson does, that: “…it is in men’s minds that wars of 
subversion have to be fought and decided.”205  
The point being made here is that NORSOF needs to understand the importance 
of PSYOP206 and when possible, to the greatest extent possible use PSYOP when 
conducting its own operations. This is not to say that NORSOF must focus its operations 
solely on PSYOP but more that NORSOF should seek to implement PSYOP as one of its 
lines of operations when conducting counterinsurgency. However, as Norway has a very 
limited PSYOP capability, utilizing Norwegian PSYOP assets in larger scale is not 
feasible. Emphasis should therefore be laid on utilizing other nation’s capabilities when 
they are available and deemed necessary. Another avenue implies that some NORSOF 
personnel receive adequate PSYOP training and thus can integrate PSYOP in NORSOF’s 
operations.  
It should also be mentioned that NORSOF, when operating overtly in an area, 
either when, for example, conducting population control measures such as vehicle check 
points or when interviewing people for intelligence purposes, NORSOF by its mere 
presence and actions conveys a message to the population and possible insurgents. 
Consequently, this should be understood, and, moreover, NORSOF should then seek to 
convey a message which is in accordance with the overall PSYOP campaign for this area 
or conflict, thus ensuring that NORSOF conveys the “right” message. As a corollary to 
                                                 
203 For a discussion of the role of the narrative, see for example: Montgomery McFate and  Andrea V. 
Jackson, “The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition,” 
Military Review, January – February 2006, 18-20; and, Mohammed M. Hafez, From Marginalization to 
Massacres, in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), 37-60. 
204 McFate and  Jackson, 20.  
205 Kitson, 31. 
206 PSYOPS, according to the Norwegian Joint Doctrine, is a subset of Information Operations and is 
defined as operations aimed at “…influencing understandings, attitudes and behavior and thus achieve 
desired political and military effects. Active influencing can take place either covertly or overtly – in peace, 
crisis and armed conflict. Forsvarsstaben, 137. 
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this, it is imperative that NORSOF planners and operators have a clear understanding of 
what PSYOP is and how to use it efficiently so that the desired political and military 
effects are achieved. In this regard, it should also be noted that the foundation for any 
successful PSYOP is a deep understanding of the target population’s culture, values and 
beliefs. This leads us to the next and final major implication for NORSOF, the need for 
deep cultural understanding and awareness.  
It should go without saying, that because counterinsurgency is about winning the 
allegiance of the population, cultural understanding and awareness are at the hearth of the 
matter. Consequently, cultural awareness and understanding are germane to all the 
aforementioned implications. First, how is it possible to collect information and develop 
it into precise intelligence without having insight into cultures, perceptions, values, 
beliefs, interests and decision-making processes of individuals and groups? Second, how 
can NORSOF train, advice or employ indigenous forces without a deep understanding of 
their culture, traditions, values or interests?  Finally, how can one hope to positively 
influence someone without having a profound knowledge of their country, culture, 
customs, traditions, beliefs, et cetera? The obvious answer to these questions is that 
cultural understanding and awareness do matter, and if not properly understood can lead 
to less effective operations or may even result in them having the adverse affect by for 
example alienating the population. In short, cultural understanding is imperative when 
deciding what actions will have the greatest effect. 
That cultural understanding and awareness are important have long been 
understood, as illustrated by the fact that it is a mandatory subject during any pre-
deployment work-up of any Norwegian units. However, this does not necessarily imply 
that cultural awareness and understanding are emphasized enough. This author will argue 
that such pre-deployment training only serves as an “introduction” to the subject and is 
not enough to build up the necessary competence. Having said this, it should also be 
noted that some of NORSOF’s personnel have acquired considerable expertise within this 
field due to several deployments to various cultural environments. This should be 
exploited, and this expertise as well as more scholarly expertise, represented by for 
example regional experts, sociologists and cultural anthropologists, should be utilized to 
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develop a better and deeper cultural understanding than what is currently the case. 
Cultural awareness and understanding should thus be implemented on a more regularly 
basis in NORSOF’s training and exercises, which to this author’s knowledge is not being 
done today. It should also be considered to differentiate this training so that some staff 
personnel and operators are being specialized within this field in order to gain an even 
deeper cultural knowledge. In addition to this, it should also be considered to actively 
recruit more Norwegians of foreign decent into NORSOF, especially from areas where 
NORSOF is likely to operate in the future. To sum up my arguments, cultural awareness 
and understanding are of utmost importance when conducting counterinsurgency 
operations. Moreover, the better and deeper NORSOF’s cultural understanding and 
awareness are, the greater the chances of success. 
Having discussed some of the implications that counterinsurgency entails for 
NORSOF, this begs the question of what NORSOF’s limitations regarding such 
operations are. 
C. WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS CONCERNING NORSOF’S ROLES OR 
CAPABILITIES REGARDING COUNTERINSURGENCY?  
When answering this question, one should have in mind that a sound 
counterinsurgency response is one that encompasses a wide range of civil and military 
programs, but where the latter is subjugated to and supporting the civilian effort. Thus, 
counterinsurgency demands the seamless integration of informational, political, social, 
cultural, law enforcement, economic, military, and intelligence activities. As a corollary 
to this, the military response is only one component, though an essential one. Likewise, 
counterinsurgency is usually a personnel intensive enterprise. The number of 
counterinsurgents in relation to the number of insurgents has to be high as it usually takes 
a large number of security forces to provide the necessary security and thus establish the 
regime’s legitimacy. The essence, as many analysts have noted, is to have as many 
security forces as possible embedded in the local community and constantly patrolling it 
for the population to feel secure and thus give their allegiance to the government.207   
                                                 
207 O’Neill, 162; and Galula, 57. 
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As a corollary to the aforementioned, it seems reasonable to argue that 
NORSOF’s role in any counterinsurgency campaign inherently will be limited. This 
limitation is arguably a result of three factors. First, the military and thus special 
operations forces are only one component of the government response. Second, because 
NORSOF lacks crucial capabilities like PSYOP, CIMIC, engineering, and the like, 
NORSOF will thus not be able to provide all the necessary military capabilities. Third, 
because NORSOF, as most special operations units, has strict acceptance criteria, 
NORSOF can only field a relatively small force compared to conventional forces. 
Accordingly, it is probably fair to summarize that NORSOF and its operations will have 
to be complemented by other means and forces. Moreover, of the same reasons, 
NORSOF should therefore not be considered a panacea for counterinsurgency. 
NORSOF’s relatively small size compared to conventional forces also results in 
another limitation – continuity. When NORSOF deploys, it is usually for a very limited 
time period, measured in months rather than years. Concerning the need for continuity in 
counterinsurgency, Frank Kitson, for example, advises that: “One of the main factors is 
continuity, and a platoon or company which can stay in the same region for a long time is 
worth several times as many men who are constantly moved from one place to another, 
because the contacts and background knowledge which the stationary troops can build up 
in a particular area.”208 Consequently, when deploying NORSOF, it should be for the 
longest period possible.  
D. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the preceding discussion, I will argue that my initial hypothesis - that 
NORSOF is less than optimally suited for counterinsurgency operations – is correct. 
NORSOF’s capabilities are therefore not consistent with today’s security environment 
which is characterized more by unorthodox threats like for example insurgencies, 
international terrorism, etc., and less by “conventional” wars between nation states. 
Given the prevalence of insurgent conflicts and that the Norwegian government has 
expressed that its armed forces must be prepared to contribute effectively to various 
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multinational peace operations, and, moreover, that NORSOF is a strategic asset, it 
should be clear that there is need for a NORSOF counterinsurgency capability. When 
examining how NORSOF’s understanding of counterinsurgency matches with historic 
best practices, this author asserts that NORSOF has mainly focused on a direct approach 
and kinetic operations while focusing less on an indirect approach and non-kinetic 
operations. Consequently, NORSOF is less than optimally suited for counterinsurgency 
operations. By also emphasizing the indirect approach; NORSOF’s efficacy will be 
further enhanced. Moreover, when comparing historic best practices with NORSOF’s 
current practices several implications can be drawn. First, good intelligence is the 
foundation for any sound counterinsurgency. NORSOF, having already recognized this, 
should, however, in addition to focus mainly on the insurgents also focus more on the 
population. Thus, NORSOF can gain intelligence that can lead to the insurgents and their 
support base. Second, NORSOF in addition to Special Reconnaissance and Direct Action 
missions should put more emphasis on Military Assistance like training and/or employing 
host nation security forces, or advising the host nation on how to best implement its 
counterinsurgency measures. Not only will this lead to the host nation government 
increasing its legitimacy, it will also increase the government’s ability to effectively 
govern its own country. Third, NORSOF has to understand the importance of PSYOP 
and take it into consideration when planning and conducting its operations. This as 
effective PSYOP is complementary to other counterinsurgency measures, and, moreover, 
is an important tool for winning the hearts and minds of the population. Fourth, NORSOF 
needs to develop a deeper and better cultural awareness and understanding, as this is the 
foundation for any of the three aforementioned implications. This field have until now 
not received the necessary attention by NORSOF. This study also finds that although 
NORSOF can play an important role in combating an insurgency, there are also some 
limitations concerning NORSOF’s roles or capabilities. These limitations are partly a 
result of the inherent limitations of military force but also a result of a lack of capabilities 
within NORSOF itself. 
Accordingly, the first recommendation would therefore be that the implications 
discussed earlier in this chapter are taken into consideration and implemented. Not only 
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will this make NORSOF more optimally suited for counterinsurgency operations, it will 
also make NORSOF more relevant for other types of irregular warfare like 
counterterrorism, counter proliferation, counter smuggling operations, and the like. This 
as a corollary to these types of operations having many of the same requirements as 
counterinsurgency operations. 
Classical counterinsurgency, as mentioned earlier, is based upon a systems 
approach. It seeks to identify key processes in an insurgent system and coordinate 
countermeasures at the systemic level. The field of Complexity theory, however, offers 
fresh possibilities. Complexity theory takes this understanding further by showing that 
social systems (and hence, insurgencies) are organic systems. Consequently, Complexity 
theory and how it affects NORSOF is a subject that merits further study.209   
As mentioned in the introduction, this study only discusses the implications 
counterinsurgency operations have for NORSOF. Given that the study of these types of 
operations has received little attention in Norway, more research should be done to 
investigate how irregular warfare in general and counterinsurgency operations 
specifically affects the NAF. Further study is necessary to determine how Norwegian 
forces fit into the larger picture of counterinsurgency and how they best can cooperate 
with the other military and civilian actors in such a conflict.   
                                                 
209 For an example of how to use Comlexity theory against the al-Quaeda network see: David 
Kilcullen, ”Countering Global Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 30 November 2004 [Journal online]; 
Available from http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf; Internet;  accessed 7 May 2008.  
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